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A legal opinion or an opinion of counsel is a formal written document prepared by
an attorney at a client's request which expresses the lawyer's informed understanding of
the law as it applies to a transaction or a specific aspect of a transaction.' In the securities
area in particular, the rendering of legal opinions has become an important component
of an attorney's work. 2 In registering a security which will be offered to the public for
the first time, an opinion of counsel concerning the legality of the offering must accom-
pany the registration statement when it is filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC or Commission). 3 Moreover, legal opinions are frequently sought by parties
in securities transactions which do not require filing reports with the Commission, but
which involve issues concerning compliance with securities laws.' A legal opinion has
often been called a "passkey" to a securities transaction 9 because the attorney's opinion
regarding the applicability of certain securities regulations may determine whether the
securities will be sold. 6 Thus, in reliance on the professional opinions of securities
attorneys, millions of dollars of securities permanently enter the trading markets.?
At common law, an attorney's duty to exercise reasonable care in rendering legal
opinions ran only to the client. 9 Because the client had engaged the opining lawyer and
because they had a contractual relationship — referred to as privity — only the client
could sue an opining attorney for negligent performance of his duties . 2 Even after the
passage of the federal securities laws, the courts and the SEC imposed sanctions and
civil liability against an opining attorney only when the lawyer was an active participant
Report of the Committee on Corporations Regarding Legal Opinions in Business Transactions, 14 PAC.
L.J. 1001, 1005 (1983); Landau, Legal Opinions Rendered in Securities Transactions, 8 INST. ON SEC.
REG. 13, 13 (1977); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (5th ed. 1979).
See Fuld, Lawyers' Standards and Responsibilities in Rendering Opinions, 33 Bus. LAW. 1295, 1316
(1978); Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions: An Attempt to Bring Some Order Out of Chaos, 28
Bus. LAw. 915, 915, 945 (1973); Gruenbaum, CorporatelSecurities Lawyer: Disclosure, Responsibility to
Investors and National Student Marketing Corp., 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 795, 804 (1979); see also
Commissioner Sommer's Speech on the Emerging Responsibilities of a Securities Lawyer,[1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1179,631, at 83,688 ( Jan., 1974) [hereinafter cited as Sommer].
3
 Schedule A of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(29) (1982), provides that an opinion of
counsel regarding legality of an issue is required to be continued in registration statements filed
under the 1933 Act.
Opinions of counsel are often rendered in connection with issues of exemptions from regis-.
tration requirements of the Securities Act; rules under the Exchange Act concerning trading in
securities, the validity or nature of securities (that is, whether something is a security); or corporate
matters relating to a securities transaction (that is, the corporate status of the issuer). See Report By
Special Committee on Lawyer's Role in Securities Transactions: The Association of the Bar of New York City,
33 Bus. LAW. 1343, 1350 (1978); Note, Attorneys' Liability To Third Parties For Corporate Opinion Letters,
65 B.U.L. REV. 415, 417-20 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Attorneys' Liability].
For example, if an attorney provides a legal opinion that securities are exempt from the
registration requirements of section 5 of Securities Act, the securities are sold without registration
with the SEC. If an unfavorable opinion is given, the stock is usually not sold. See Gruenbaum,
supra note 2, at 798-99; Shipman, The Need for S.E.C. Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities
of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OH/0 ST. L.J. 231, 267 (1974); see also Sommer,
supra note 2, at 83,689.
5 See authorities cited supra note 5.
See authorities cited supra note 5.
This rule was first adopted in National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879).
'See, e.g., National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 206 (1879); Hodges v. Carter, 239
N.C. 517, 519, 80 S.E.2d. 144, 145-46 (1954); see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS 667-68




in a plan to defraud investors.'° In contrast, where an opining attorney was not a
principal in the overall scheme to defraud, and functioned only in a professional capacity
advising clients, no sanctions were imposed." As a general rule, therefore, an attorney
who was guilty of negligence or misfeasance not amounting to fraud in a securities
transaction was exposed to liability only in the form of malpractice actions brought by
injured clients.
This traditional limitation on the liability of an opining attorney under common taw
and the federal securities statutes was inexorably linked to the historic view that a lawyer
owed an "unremitting loyalty" to the interests of the client.' 2 Under this view, a lawyer's
responsibility was to act in a manner which would best advance the interests of the
client.' 3 Thus, traditionally, both the securities bar and the regulatory agencies consid-
ered the role of an opining securities attorney to be similar to that of a scrivener, whose
function was simply to frame the client's ideas in the proper legal form.' 4
During the 1960's and the early 1970's, the American Bar Association (ABA), the
SEC, and the courts began to take a more expansive view of the role and responsibilities
of an opining securities attorney.' 5 Because of the importance of legal opinions in the
securities area and the need for the investing public to be able to rely on these opinions,
the Commission and the courts began requiring opining securities attorneys to take a
more objective and independent role in rendering legal opinions. 16 Thus, opining se-
'° See, e.g., Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1053 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); SEC v. A.G. Bellin Corp., 171
F. Supp. 233, 235-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); in re Morris MacSchwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347, modified, 40 S.E.C.
459 (1961); In re James DeWitt, 38 S.E.C. 879 (1959); In re Marshall I. Stewart, Securities Act
Release No. 4829 (April 29, 1966).
" See, e.g., Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Colo. 1965); Woneman v. Stratford
Securities Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCEI) 1191,034, at 93,460 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). For law review articles supporting this traditional view of opining lawyers' liability, see
Jenkins, Attorney Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 J. CORP. L. 505, 510 (1977); Leiman,
Liability of Attorneys Involved in the Preparation of Disclosure Documents, 13 INsE. ON SEC. REG. 277,
278-79 (1982); Lowenfils, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New
Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 CoLum. L. REV. 412, 413-16 (1974); Rowe,
Potential Liability Under the Securities Laws for Rendering Legal Opinions, in OPINION LETTERS OF COUNCIL
347 (1984).
12 See Freeman, Liability of Counsel for the Issuer, 24 Bus. LAW. 635, 639 (1969); Frank, A New
Look at the Ethics of the Corporate Lawyer, 26 CLEV. Sr. L. REV. 337, 338 (1977); Jenkins, supra note
11, at 506-07, 510-1 I; Lowenfils, supra note 11, at 415; Patterson, The Limits of Lawyers' Discretion
and the Law of Legal Ethics, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1251-55; Sommer, supra note 2, at 83,689.
13 See authorities cited supra note 11; see also American Finance Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1049 (1962).
14 See Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys In Practice Before the SEC, 25 MERCER
L. REV. 637, 637-41 (1974); Leiman, supra note 11, at 277-79; Sommer, supra note 2, at 83,689-
90.
15 See Frank, supra note 12, at 334-41, 345-50; Leiman, supra note 11, at 278-29; Lowenfils,
supra note 11, at 418-19; Patterson, supra note 12, at 1251-55; Rowe, supra note 11, at 370;
Sommers, supra note 2, at 83,689-90. For other statements by SEC Commissioners, see Mathews,
Liabilities of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws, 30 Bus. LAW. 105, 116-21 (1975)1, [hereinafter
cited as Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyers]; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC
7-3, 7-4 and 7-5 (1979); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335
(1974).
'" See Leiman, supra note 11, at 278-79; Sommer, supra note 2, at 83,687-90; see also SEC v.
Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 488-89 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Emmanuel Fields, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CO4)1179,407, at 83,174 n.20 ( June 18, 1973).
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curities attorneys were no longer viewed as owing loyalty only to the interests of their .
clients. Instead, these attorneys were now perceived as also having a duty of protecting
the interests of the investing public.I 7
With this more expansive view of the role and responsibilities of opining securities
attorneys under the federal securities laws, the courts and the Commission began to
broaden the scope of liability of attorneys for rendering opinions in the securities area."
Both the SEC and injured investors brought actions with increasing frequency against
lawyers as well as their clients when they believed that the attorneys had aided their
clients in illegal transactions." For the first time, the courts and the SEC were willing to
impose legal sanctions and civil liability against opining attorneys who had acted solely
in a professional capacity as advisors to their clients." In fact, during this time period,
the Commission and the courts imposed sanctions on attorneys for simple negligence in
issuing opinions. 21 Moreover, during the 1970's, the SEC also asserted that securities
attorneys not only had a duty to advise clients not to engage in fraudulent activities, but
also if a client refused to follow this advice and intended to violate the securities laws,
the lawyer had a duty to resign and to notify the Commission about the client's conduct. 22
According to the SEC, a lawyer's failure to "blow the whistle on a client" constituted a
violation of the securities laws."
Today, however, the SEC and the courts appear to have retreated from the positions
they took regarding the potential liability and ethical responsibilities of an opining
attorney under the securities laws. 24 While the Commission and the courts will still impose
liability on an attorney who acts solely in an advisory capacity issuing opinions for a
client, mere negligence by a lawyer in rendering opinions will not suffice for sanctions
or civil liability to he imposed on the attorney." For an opining attorney to be subject to
liability under the securities laws today, the Commission or a private party must show
17 See authorities cited supra notes 13 and 14.
11' For a discugsion of this increasing liability in the context of SEC injunctive actions see infra
notes 199-204 and accompanying text. See infra notes 321-48 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of this issue in the context of Rule 2(e) disciplinary actions. See infra notes 401-24 for a
discussion of this pattern in actions brought by private plaintiffs to recover damages under the
federal securities laws.
15 See supra note 18.
2" See supra note 18.
21 See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950
(1979); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. Humans v. SEC, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir.
1973); In re Carter and Johnson, [1979 Transfer Binder} FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175, at
82,180 (Mar. 7, 1979) (trial).
22 This view of securities attorneys' duties was first put forth by the SEC's filing of the National
Student Marketing complaint. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 93,360, at 91,913-15 —17 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972). For a discussion
of the SEC's filing of this complaint and the litigation which followed it, see infra notes 218-63 and
accompanying text.
25 National Student Marketing Corp, (complaint), at 91,913- 15 — 17; see also Cruenbaum, supra note
2, at 796-98; Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 462-68 (1974),
" See, e.g., SEC v. Haswell, 658 F.2d 698, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1981); In re Carter and Johnson
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11[ 82,847, at 84,167 (Feb. 28, 1981) (appeal).
25 See, e.g., SEC v. Haswell, 658 F.2d 698, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1981); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d
779, 783-84 (8th Cir. 1981); Carter and fohnsem, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fen. Sec. L. REP. ¶ 82,847,
at 84,167 (appeal).
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that the lawyer knowingly or recklessly issued an erroneous legal opinion which sub-
stantially assisted the perpetration of a securities fraud. 26 Similarly, the SEC has aban-
doned its position that securities attorneys' duty to the investing public includes an
obligation to report a client's fraudulent activities to the Commission 2 7 Instead, the
opining lawyer must take appropriate steps to avoid being co-opted into the fraudulent
activity. 28 As in other areas of the law, if the attorney is unable to convince the client to
rectify the fraud, he has a duty to resign. 28
This note will examine the evolution in opining securities attorneys' liability which
has occurred during the last twenty years and will provide practitioners with an indication
of the extent of their potential liability today. It will focus on the three principal types
of actions which may be instituted against opining securities attorneys under the federal
securities laws: (1) a civil injunctive action brought by the SEC seeking to restrain an
attorney from further violations of the federal securities laws; (2) a Rule 2(e) disciplinary
proceeding instituted by the SEC under which an attorney can be temporarily or per-
manently denied the privilege of practicing before the Commission; and (3) a civil action
brought by a private litigant seeking recovery for damages allegedly suffered because of
an attorney's violation of the provisions of the federal securities laws. The note will
describe and discuss each of these actions in the context of the recent evolution of the
potential liability of opining attorneys. Finally, it will discuss the impact of this evolution
of potential liability on practicing securities lawyers and the investing public.
The first section of this note presents an overview of the three principal types of
actions which may be brought against opining securities attorneys under the federal
securities laws. The traditional limits on the liability of opining lawyers under these
actions will be discussed in the second section of the note. The third section analyzes the
expansion in the potential liability of opining securities attorneys in these three types of
actions which occurred during the 1970's. In addition, this section examines the current
rejection by the SEC and the courts of the expanded liability imposed on opining
attorneys in the preceding decade. The fourth section of the note analyzes the impact
which this evolution in potential liability has had on practicing securities lawyers and the
investing public. This note concludes that the current standard of liability provides
protection for the interests of investors, without having a chilling effect on the actions
of opining lawyers in the securities area.
26See, e.g., T.J. Raney Sc Sons v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333
(10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1295-
96 (9th Cir. 1982); SEC V. Haswell, 658 F.2d 698, 699 (10th Cir. 1981); Cronin v. Midwestern
Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th Cir. 1980); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. Util.
Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1204-10 (W.D. Mo. 1983); In re North Am. Acceptance Corp. Securities
Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608, 628-29 (N.D. Ca. 1981); Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 82,847, at 84,167 (appeal).
27 See, e.g., Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 'I 82,847, at
84,172-73 (appeal); see also Laayers' Disciplinary Proceedings Before the SEC, [1981 - 1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)1183,089 at 84,800 ( Jan. 13, 1982) (speech by SEC General Counsel
Ed Greene) [hereinafter cited as Greene].
22 See, e.g., Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 9 82,847, at
84,172-73 (appeal).
" Id. See also Friedman, Reflections on Carter-Johnson, 1:3 INST. ON SEC. REC. 297, 297-98 (1982);
Kronstein, The Carter-Johnson Case: A Higher Threshold for SEC Action Against Lawyers, 9 Sec. REC.
L.J. 293, 293-96 (1981).
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I. THE THREE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF ACTIONS WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT AGAINST AN
OPINING SECURITIES ATTORNEY UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Under common law, an opining attorney could be subject to an action in tort for
legal malpractice." With the passage of the federal securities laws, three new potential
sources of liability for opining securities attorneys were created: (1) an SEC civil injunctive
action; (2) a Rule 2(e)" disciplinary proceeding; and (3) a civil action brought by a private
litigant for damages suffered because of violations of the securities laws. This section of
the note will describe the essential elements of each of these actions and the potential
consequences of these actions on lawyers.
A. SEC Injunctive Actions
An opining securities attorney may be subject to civil injunctive actions brought by
the SEC to restrain a lawyer from further violations of the federal securities laws.
Pursuant to section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 32 and section 21(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act), 3y the SEC is authorized to bring civil
" See Landau, supra note 1, at 27; see also Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973
DUKE L.J. 372, 377-87 [hereinafter cited as Freeman, Opinion Letters]; Wade, The'Attorney's Liability
for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755, 762-65 (1959); Note, Attorneys' Liability, supra note 4, at 428-
33. Legal malpractice consists of failure of an attorney to exercise the care, knowledge, skill, and
diligence ordinarily possessed and generally recognized by members of the legal profession. When
failure to exercise such care proximately caused damages to an individual it gave rise to an action
for negligence in tort. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 358, 530 P.2d 589, 593, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 621, 627 (1975); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal, 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
825 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 519, 80 S.E.2d 144,
145-48 (1954).
" Rule 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1984), provides:
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing
or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after
notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the requisite
qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to
have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully
violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the federal
securities laws (15 U.S.C. § 77a to 80b-20), or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Id.
" Section 20(b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1982), provides in part:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to
engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the
provisions of this subchapter, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under authority
thereof, it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district court of the United
States or United States court of any Territory, to enjoin such acts or practices, and
upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order
shall be granted without bond ....
Id.
"Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.G. § 78u(d) (1982), states:
Wherever it shall appear that any person is engaged or is about to engage in acts or
practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter, the rules or regula-
tions thereunder, the rules of a national securities exchange or registered securities
association of which such a person is a member or a person associated with a member,
the rules of a registered clearing agency in which such person is a participant, or the
rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, it may in its discretion bring an
action in the proper district court of the United States, the United States District Court
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injunctive actions against any person currently engaged, previously engaged, or about
to engage, in any acts or practices that constitute violations of the provisions of these
statutes or the rules or regulations promulgated thereunder. To obtain a permanent
injunction, the Commission must prove by a preponderance of evidences' that a statutory
violation has been or is about to be committed and that, in the view of the defendant's
past conduct, a reasonable likelihood of future violations of the Federal securities laws
exists," Upon appropriate proof by the SEC, a court will issue an injunctive decree
commanding the defendant to permanently refrain from committing acts that violate
the federal securities laws." Thus, at least theoretically, an injunctive suit is a preventive
or deterrent action aimed at protecting the public from further injury or harm."
SEC civil injunctive actions have generally been brought against opining attorneys
for alleged violations of section 10(b)" of the Exchange Act and Rule 101r-5 59 promul-
gated pursuant to the Exchange Act, and section 17(a) 40 of the Securities Act.'" Section
for the District of Columbia, or the United States courts of any territory or other place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practices, and
upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order
shall be granted without bond. The Commission may transmit such evidence as may
be available concerning such acts or practices as may constitute a violation of any
provisions of this chapter or the rules or regulations thereunder to the Attorney
General, who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under
this chapter. .
Id.
34 Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96 (1981); SEC v. First Fin. Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429,
434-35 (5th Cir. 1981). For a good discussion of the requisite standard of proof in SEC actions for
injunctive relief, see Casenote, SEC Actions for Injunctive Relief in Securities Fraud Cases: SEC v. First
Financial Group of Texas, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1529 (1982).
3' United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). Although the W.T. Grant case was
brought under the antitrust laws, the same standard is applicable in cases arising under the federal
securities laws. See, e.g., SEC v. Haswell, 658 F.2d 698, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044,
1048 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
36 See Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 5 Rev. SEC. REG. 969, 969 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions]; Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyers, supra note 15, at 106.
37 Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, supra note 36, at 969; see also SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d
1020, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 950 (1979); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp.,
546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976).
33 Section 10(b) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
'9 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b75 (1984), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
4° 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). For the text and a discussion of section 17, see infra note 65 and
accompanying text.
41 See, e.g., SEC v. Haswell, 65.8 F.2d 698, 699 (10th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020,
1021 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d
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10(b) is a "catchall anti-fraud provision" 92 proscribing fraud or any material misstatement
or omission by any person in connection with the sale or purchase of any security. For
violating the provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule 106-5, a person can be subject to
primary or secondary liability."
In order to be subject to primary liability, a person must have actively participated
in a scheme to defraud investors or must have violated a duty he or she owed directly
to a plaintiff." A plaintiff must prove three factors to establish a primary violation of
Section 10(b): (1) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact" by the defendant
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (2) reliance" by the plaintiff in
buying or selling the security upon the misrepresentation or omission; and (3) "scienter"
by the defendant in connection with that misrepresentation or omission. 47 This scienter
requirement was defined by the Supreme Court in the 1976 case of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder'5 as a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."49
As a result of this definition, the Hochfelder Court held that mere negligence by an
individual in misstating or omitting a material fact was insufficient to establish a violation
of section 10(b) in an action brought by a private plaintiff." Four years later in Aaron v.
SEC,' the Court extended the scienter requirement under section 10(b) to injunctive
actions brought by the SEC." The Supreme Court has expressly left open the issue of
Cir. 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 699-700 (1).D.C. 1978);
SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FEn. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1193,232, at 91,438 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1971).
12 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).
" See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 93-95 (5th Cir. 1975); Rose v.
Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1199 (W.D. Mo. 1983); In re North Am.
Acceptance Corp. Securities Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608, 624-25 (N.D. Ga. 1981). See generally Ruder,
Secondary Liability in Securities Fraud Cases, 8 INST. ON SEC. REG. 407 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Ruder, Secondary Liability]; Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pan Delecto and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ruder,
Multiple Defendants].
41 See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 93-95 (5th Cir. 1975); Rose v.
Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1199 & n.32 (W.D. Mo. 1983); see also
Ruder, Multiple Defendants, supra note 43, at 612-20.
45 A fact is deemed material if there is substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider it important in determining whether to purchase or sell. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
16 The reliance requirement is traditionally satisfied upon proof that "the misrepresentation is
a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in ... loss." T.J. Raney &
Sons v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1332 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir. 1971) (quoting List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965))), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984). In cases where the
primary issue is an omission of information, there is a rebuttable presumption of reliance if the
plaintiff can show the omission was material. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 153-54 (1971).
47 See, e.g., Croy v. Cambell, 624 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank of
Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 93 (5th Cir. 1975); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Utif. Auth., 562 F. Stipp.
1180, 1199 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION, 808-12 (5th ed. 1982).
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
4B
	 at 193 n.12.
" Id. at 193.
" 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
52 Id at 691.
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whether recklessness" satisfies this scienter requirement in both private claims and SEC
injunctive actions.5' All courts of appeals which have considered the issue have held that
recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement under section 10(b) for
primary or principal wrongdoers."
An opining attorney may also be subject to secondary liability under section . 10(b)
for "aiding and abetting" a federal securities law violation by a primary wrongdoer. 56
While the elements have not yet crystalized into a set pattern," the three general
requirements for establishing an aiding and abetting violation of section 10(b) are: (1)
the existence of a securities law violation by a "primary" party; (2) the aider and abettor
knowingly and substantially assisted the conduct that constitutes the violation; and (3)
awareness or knowledge by the aider and abettor that his role was part of an activity
that was improper or illegal." To satisfy this third element of aiding and abetting which
is often referred to as the knowledge or "intent" portion of the offense, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant acted with scienter." The Supreme Court has also left
unresolved the sufficiency of recklessness to satisfy this scienter requirement for aiders
and abettors. 6° Accordingly, federal courts have taken different approaches to this issue.
Some courts, for example, have stated that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement
for both primary and secondary violations of section 10(b). 6 ' Others have held that
recklessness will not establish scienter in an aiding and abetting action unless the defen-
" In Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp, 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976), a
district court put forth one of the most frequently quoted definitions of the recklessness which is
sufficient to establish scienter. According to the Franke court:
In the context of an omissions case, reckless conduct may be defined as a highly
unreasonable omission involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence,
but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care which presents a danger
of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious
that the actor must have been aware of it.
Id. at 725. See also W. CAR? & M. EISENBURG, CORPORATIONS 820 (5th ed. 1980).
54 Herman Sc MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.4 (1983); Aaron, 446 U.S. at 85 n.5;
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
" See, e.g., ITT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d Cir. 1980); Mclean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d
1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1980); Hoffman v. Eastbrook, 587 F.2d 509, 516-17 (1st Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir.
1977).
56 For examples of SEC injunctive actions brought against opining attorneys, see, e.g., SEC v.
Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1025-28 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp.
682, 700-01 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 646-50
(D.D.C. 1975); see also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 47, at 1133-37; Leiman, supra note 11,
at 283-85. This concept of aiding and abetting originated in the field of criminal law, which has
traditionally held that whoever aids and abets the commission of a crime is punishable as a primary
violator. Ruder, Multiple Defendants, supra note 43, at 627.
57 Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1975).
58 See, e.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 1981); ITT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d
909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consolidated Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied
434 U.S. 930 (1978). See generally Brunelle, A Contemporary Legal Context Analysis of Aiding and Abetting,
11 SEC. REG. L.J. 182, 182-83 (1983).
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193; see also cases cited supra note 58.
60 Herman Sc MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.4 (1983); Aaron, 446 U.S. at 687
n,5; Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
°I See, e.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981); Boyles v. Dodge, [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 98,467, at 92,734 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1982),
334	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:325
dant owes a particularized duty to the plaintiff. 62
 Still other courts have found reckless-
ness sufficient to meet the scienter requirement of aiding and abetting where it was
foreseeable by the defendant that a class of persons such as the plaintiff would rely on
his statement.°
SEC civil injunctive actions are also frequently brought against attorneys for viola-
tions of section 17(a) of the Securities Act. 61 Section 17(a) is similar to Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, except that it applies only to sales, not purchases, of securities." Thus,
the requirements of establishing the existence of primary or secondary liability under
section 17(a) are very similar to the standards for proving liability under section 10(b).66
In Aaron v. SEC, however, the Supreme Court held that the SEC was required to establish
scienter as an element of a civil enforcement action brought for violations of section
10(b) and section 17(a)(1), but that the Commission did not have to prove that a defen-
dant acted with scienter to establish violations of sections 17(a)(2) and I 7(a)(3) of the
Securities Acts' In civil injunctive actions based on the violation of these later two
" See, e.g., Edwards and Hanley v. Wells Fargo Securities Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 44, 47 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
63 See, e.g., Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 957, 960-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re
North Am. Securities, 513 F. Supp. 606, 626 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer
Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1196,898, at 95,698-700 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 623 F.2d 791, 795 (2d Cir. 1980); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 888
(E.D. Pa. 1978).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Haswell, 654 F.2d 698, 698 (10th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020,
1021 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 642 (D.D.C.
1975).
65 Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly —
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement or a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id. Because of the similarity between section 17 of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, claims under section 17(a) are usually put forth in conjunction under section 10(b)
claims and courts often neglect to discuss section 17(a). See Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule
106-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 65 VA. L. REV. 641, 647-59 (1978); see
also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 47, at 817-18.
66 See, e.g., Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Felts v.
National Account Sys. Ass'n, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 54, 64, 68 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
67 Aaron, 446 U.S. at 695-700. In Hochfelder, the Court had held that the language of section
10, specifically the terms "manipulative," ''device," and "contrivance," manifested congressional
intent that the section was concerned only with knowing and intentional misconduct and, thus,
scienter was required. 425 U.S. at 197-99. In Aaron, the Court held that section 17(a)(1)'s language
"to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" showed a similar intent by Congress to
proscribe only knowing or intentional misconduct. 446 U.S. at 696. Thus, the Court held that the
SEC was required to establish scienter when bringing a civil injunctive action under this section. Id.
The Court stated, however, that no language in either § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3) evinced congressional
intent that these sections should apply only to cases involving fraudulent misconduct. 446 U.S. at
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provisions of the Securities Act, the Court stated that the SEC need only show negligence
by the defendant."
Several direct and indirect consequences arise from entry of a permanent injunction
against an attorney." If a defendant fails to comply with the terms of an injunctive
decree, he may be prosecuted for either civil or criminal contempt of court." Also, under
the SEC's disciplinary rules of practice, the entry of a permanent injunction against an
individual automatically allows the Commission to temporarily deny that person the
privilege of practicing or appearing before the SEC and could lead to the attorney's
permanent disqualification from practicing securities law. 2 L Entry of a permanent in-
junction against an attorney is also likely to increase the probability of civil actions being
brought against the attorney by private litigants. 72 In addition, under the Supreme
Court's decision in Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc., v. Shore," a private plaintiff can employ
offensive collateral estoppel to preclude an attorney from relitigating issues of fact
decided against him in an SEC civil injunctive action." Given these potentially adverse
effects of a SEC injunctive action, the imposition of a permanent injunction against an
attorney may well do more damage to his business .and securities law practice than would
an adverse money judgment in a private damage action. 75
B. Rule 2(e) Proceedings
In addition to potential liability in SEC injunctive actions, an opining securities
attorney may be subject to disciplinary proceedings brought by the SEC under Rule 2(e)
of the Commission's rules of practice." The Commission has stated that Rule 2(e) is not
696-97. Therefore, for injunctive actions brought under these sections, scienter is not a require-
ment. Id. at 697.
68 446 U.S. at 700-01. The Aaron Court did state, however, that the degree of scienter in an
attorney's past conduct could be very important in a court's consideration of the "likelihood of
future violations by the defendant" which the SEC is required to prove in order to obtain an
injunction. Id. at 701. See also id. at 703 (Burger, C.J., concurring); SEC v. Haswell, 654 F.2d 698,
699-700 (10th Cir. 1981).
69 See Block, An Overview: Responsibilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Laws, 36 Bus.
LAW. 1781, 1782 (1981); Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyers, supra note 15, at 105-106; Mathews, SEC
Civil Injunctive Actions, supra note 36, at 969-71.
70 See Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyers, supra note 15, at 105; Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions,
supra note 36, at 969-71.
7 ' Under Rule 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1984), after the entry of the injunction, the attorney
is temporarily suspended from appearing before the Commission. After being notified of the
suspension, the lawyer has thirty days to apply to the Commission to request that the suspension
be lifted. If such a request is not made, the suspension becomes permanent. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(ii). At
the hearing, the burden of proof is on the attorney to present evidence of mitigating circumstances
showing why permanent suspensions is inappropriate. In presenting evidence, the attorney is pre-
cluded from contesting "any finding made against him or facts admitted by him in the [priori
judicial or administrative hearing .. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(iv); see also Johnson, supra note 14, at 648-
49; Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAW. 987, 999-1000 (1980).
72 See Sommer, supra note 2, at 83,692.
72 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
" Id. at 331-33.
75 See Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyers, supra note 15, at 106.
7° For text of Rule 2(e), see supra note 31. While the federal securities laws do not provide the
SEC with express authority to discipline attorneys who practice before it, courts have recognized
that there is no need for a federal administrative agency to have specific authority to regulate the
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intended to provide an alternative remedy to its powers to seek injunctive relief for
violations of the federal securities laws. Rather, it is a method of protecting the investing
public from professionals who have abused the privilege of practicing before the Com-
mission."
As originally promulgated in 1935, Rule 2(e) provided the SEC with the power to
temporarily or permanently deny professionals, such as attorneys, the privilege of ap-
pearing before it. 78 Such disciplinary action could be taken upon a finding, after notice
and opportunity for a hearing, that the attorney lacked the requisite qualifications to
represent others or was lacking in character or integrity or had engaged in unethical or
unprofessional conduct. 79 In 1970, Rule 2(e) was amended to add willful violations and
willful aiding and abetting violations of the federal securities laws as other grounds for
temporarily or permanently suspending an attorney from practicing before the Com-
mission. 8° Because the Commission has characterized the opportunity of an attorney to
practice before it as a "privilege," the standard of proof applicable in a Rule 2(e)
proceeding is the "preponderance of the evidence" rather than the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard applicable in actions involving deprivation of rights."
conduct of professionals who practice before it. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570,
579 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Goldsmith v. United
States Bd. of Tax Appeal, 270 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1926) (Supreme Court rejected the need for
specific statutory provisions for a federal administrative agency to regulate the conduct of profes-
sionals). Such power is inherent in such a quasi-judicial body's rule-making authority. Touche, Ross
& Co., 609 F.2d at 579. Pursuant to this recognition, the SEC promulgated Rule 2(e), which is the
Commission's disciplinary rule governing the conduct of lawyers and other professionals who
practice before it. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1984).
If a Rule 2(e) action is brought against an individual, a hearing for the purpose of taking
evidence will be brought before an administrative law judge (ALD. id. § 201.11. After the presen-
tation of evidence, the AL] hands down a decision which sets forth: findings and conclusions upon
all material issues of fact and law; an appropriate order; a statement of the time within which a
petition for review by the Commission may be filed. Id. § 201.16. If no petition is filed within the
appropriate time period, the decision of the ALJ is final. Id. If a petition is made within the requisite
time period, the SEC will review the AI J's order and decide whether to uphold it or reverse it. Id.
§ 201.17.
77 In re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,847, at
84,149 (Feb. 28, 1981).
'a See Kemp, Disciplinary Proceedings by the SEC Against Attorneys, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 23, 23
(1965). The Commission broadly interprets which activities constitute the privilege of appearing
before it. For example, in a consent decree under which an attorney's privilege of appearing before
the Commission was suspended for twelve months, the SEC stated that during this time period the
lawyer:
shall not prepare or disseminate any oral or written opinions involving matters arising
under the federal securities laws; shall not directly advise, either orally or in writing
any issuer with regard to any security being offered to the public; and shall not provide
any consulting services to any other attorney unless such other attorney states that he
alone is responsible for the preparation of any oral or written opinion to be dissemi-
nated regarding the public offering.
In re Hodgin, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,334, at 82,427 (Sept. 27, 1979).
79 Kemp, supra note 78, at 23.
"') 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(iii) (1984). See Securities Act Release No. 5147 (May 10, 1971), reported
in [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1178,064.
81 Rule 2(e) expressly states that the opportunity to practice before the SEC is a privilege. 17
C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1984). In Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 100-02, rehg denied, 451 U.S. 933
(1981), the Supreme Court upheld the SEC's view that the preponderance of evidence standard
was applicable in a Rule 2(e) proceeding,
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Although the SEC has stated that a successful Rule 2(e) proceeding affects only "our
narrow type of practice" and does not affect an attorney's ability to practice other areas
of the law, 82 the consequences of a successful Rule 2(e) proceeding can be devastating
for a corporate attorney. 83 The SEC has stated that a revocation of the privilege of
appearing before it will not only prevent a disqualified attorney from engaging personally
in activities related to the Commission's work," but also will bar the attorney from
indirectly benefiting from his firm's securities law practice. 85 Thus, the disqualified lawyer
may not even receive profits from his firm's securities law practice." The rule further
provides that an entire law firm could be sanctioned for a securities law violation. 87
Under such a penalty, "partners and associates of a disqualified firm may not practice
before the Commission so long as they remain members or are associated with the
sanctioned firm."88
C. Civil Actions Brought by Private Plaintiffs Under the Federal Securities Laws
In addition to SEC injunctive and Rule 2(e) actions, an opining securities attorney
is also susceptible to civil actions brought by private plaintiffs to recover damages suffered
because of alleged violations of the provisions of the federal securities laws." While the
federal securities laws do not explicitly impose civil liability on attorneys, opining lawyers
are clearly not exempt from the civil liability and antifraud provisions of these statutes. 9°
Civil liability may be imposed on an opining securities attorney under four sections of
the federal securities laws. 8 '
Section 11 92 of the Securities Act expressly provides a right of recovery to persons
who purchase securities in conjunction with a materially misleading registration state-
82 In re Emmanuel Fields, [1.973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 78,407, at 83,174
n.20 ( June 18, 1973).
" See Barber, Lawyers Duties in Securities Transactions Under Rule 2(e): The Carter Opinion, 1982
B.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 522-29; Johnson, supra note 14, at 647-50; Marsh, supra note 71, at 993-95.
In addition, see the discussion of the sanctions issued attorney Hodgin, supra note 78.
84 17 C.F.R. § 201,2(e) (1984); see generally articles cited supra note 83.
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89 Usually, an opining attorney is subject to liability in private actions as in injunctive and 2(e)
suits for "aiding and abetting" (secondary) violations of the federal securities laws. See Leiman, supra
note I I, at 284 n.18. When a third party brings a civil action for damages against an opining lawyer,
the plaintiff will also most likely join the party who is allegedly guilty of primary violations of
securities laws. The resulting damage award would then reflect the liability of both parties. In these
types of cases, however, the primary wrongdoer is usually insolvent or bankrupt. See R. JENNINGS
& H. MARSH, SUPTa. note 47, at 1134; Leiman, supra note 11, at 278; Note, Attorneys' Liability, supra
note 4, at 435 n.131.
9° See infra notes 98, 104, 107, 109, 112, and accompanying text. See also Cheek, Professional
Responsibility and Self-Regulation of the Securities Lawyer, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 597, 605- 17 (1975);
Note, Duties and Obligations of the Securities Lawyer: The Beginning of a New Standard for the Legal
Profession, 1975 DUKE L.J. 121, 127-36 [hereinafter cited as Note, Duties and Obligations].
91 The four sections are: (1) section 11 of the Securities Act, IS U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1982); (2)
section 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982); (3) section 17 of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982); and (4) section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
82 The relevant language of section 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982), under which opining attorneys
could be subject to liability, is:
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ment filed pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act." Section 1 I imposes liability on
certain designated individuals — accountants, engineers, appraisers, or any person whose
profession lends authority to their statements — for materiar statements or omissions
contained in a registration statement which are false or misleading. These individuals
may avoid liability only if they establish that, after reasonable investigation, they had
reasonable grounds to believe that the statements included in the registration were
accurate and correct. 95
 Attorneys are, however, not expressly identified as persons on
whom civil liability can be imposed under section 11. 96 Moreover, lawyers who assist in
the preparation of registration statements or who opine upon certain legal issues for
underwriters have been held not to be "experts"" for purposes of section 11. 9° Numerous
commentators have, however, stated that attorneys who consent to the inclusion of or
reference to their opinions in registration statements are "experts" under section 1 1 (a)(4)
of the Securities Act and thus subject to liability for their opinions under this section. 99
Opining attorneys may also be subject to civil liability under section 12 of the
Securities Act.'°° Section 12 expressly provides a private right of action to a purchaser
of a security against any person who offers or sells a security (1) in violation of section
5 of the Securities Act or (2) by means of a prospectus or oral communication which
misrepresents or omits material facts.'°' Under section 12, however, plaintiffs may bring
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mislead-
ing, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such
acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, in
any court of competent jurisdiction, sue ... every accountant, engineer, or appraiser,
or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has
with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the registra-
tion statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is
used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in
such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been pre-
pared or certified by him ....
Id.
95
 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982); see also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 47, at 749-50.
" For definition of material, see supra note 45.
9 ' See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982); see also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 47, at 750.
w See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1982).
9' Experts are defined in section 1 l(a)(4) as "persons whose profession gives authority to
statements made by him ...." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1982).
98 See Tirone v. Calderone–Curran Ranches, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
1196,480, at 93,775 (W.D.N.Y. June 14, 1978); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643,
683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
" See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 47, at 756; Cheek, supra note 90, at 605 n.26; Rowe,
supra note 11, at 369-70; Shipman, supra note 5, at 236-37.
Section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1982), provides in part:
Any person who — (1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 5, or (2) offers
or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes
an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact . . .(the purchaser
not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security ....
Id.
101 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1982).
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actions only against "a person who offers or sells a security." 102 As interpreted by the
courts, a person who offers or sells a security is one who is in privity with the purchaser
or whose participation in the sale is a substantial factor in causing the transaction to take
place.'" Where significant participation by opining attorneys in sales of securities has
been established, courts have held these lawyers to be sellers within the meaning of
section 12 and subject to damages under this provision of the securities laws.'"
In addition, while neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act ex-
plicitly provide a private right of action for violation of their provisions, 105 the courts
have acknowledged the existence of an implied private right of action for primary
violations of this section for more than thirty-five years. 116 Courts have been willing to
hold opining attorneys liable for damages to third parties for primary violations of Rule
10b-5. 10 ' Also, while the Supreme Court has expressly reserved the issue of whether a
person may be liable in a private damage action as an aider and abettor under Rule
10b-5, 1 "8 several courts of appeals have recognized the existence of an implied private
right of action for damages against aiders and abettors. 109 The expansion in the potential
liability of opining securities attorneys has occurred largely through the development of
the concept of aiding and abetting liability under Rule 101}-5. 10
102 Id.
1 " See Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir. 1981); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779,
785 (8th Cir. 1981); Croy v. Cambell, 624 F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir. 1980); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d
656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Rowe, supra note 1 i, at '373-82.
ic" See funker, 650 F.2d at 1349, 1360; Katz v. Amos Treat, 411 F.2d 1046, 1053 (2d Cir. 1969).
The.attorney's liability under section 12 may also be based on an aiding and abetting theory. See
Rowe, supra note 11, at 373.
1 °5 See R. JcsaqiNcs & H. MARSH, supra note 47, at 808.
106 An implied private right of action under section 10 was first recognized in Kardon v, National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In the recent decision of Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, the Supreme Court stated, "a private right of action under Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and Rule 106-5 has been consistently recognized for more than 35 years. The existence of this
implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure." 459 U.S. 375, '381 (1983). For discussion of the
elements of establishing a primary violation of section 10(b) and Rule 106-5, see supra notes 44-
55 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982); Rose v. Arkansas
Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1199-1200, 1206-10 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Felts v.
National Account Sys. Ass'n, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 54, 64-68 (W.D. Miss. 1978).
105 Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 380 n.5; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191-
92 n.7 (1976). For a discussion of the elements of an aiding and abetting action see notes 56-63
and accompanying text.
t°9 See, e.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783-84 (8th Cir. 1981); FFI v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d
909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 44, 48-50 (2d Cir. 1978);
Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 86-88 (5th Cir. 1975). Given the Supreme Court's
recent strict interpretations of the provisions of the federal securities laws, however, one commen-
tator and a court of appeals have questioned the continued validity of civil aiding and abetting
actions. See Admiralty Funding v. Hugh Johnson, 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982) and
Fischel, Secondary Liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF, L. REV. 80, 82
(1981). No court has held, however, that civil aiding and abetting liability may not be imposed.
Also, commentators and a court have stated that the Supreme Court's analysis of the existence of
an implied action for civil liability in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-88
(1983) supports the continued existence of a civil aiding and abetting action. See Hokama v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 636,640 -41 (D. Cal. 1983); Brunelle, supra note 58, at 182.
HO See Leiman, supra note 1 1, at 279, 284 n.18; Parker, Attorneys' Liability Under the Securities
Laws, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 521, 524 (1977); see also Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1296
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In addition to these conventional theories of liability under Rule 10b-5, opining
attorneys may be subject to Rule 10b-5 civil liability under the newly developed "fraud
on the market" theory. 13 1
 One of the categories of fraud on the market liability provides
for the imposition of liability on individuals actively involved in a fraudulent scheme
which results in an entirely unmarketable security being placed on the market. 112
 This
approach to fraud on the market liability was first enunciated in the 1981 case of Shores
v. SklarLiS to relieve a plaintiff of showing actual reliance on any defendant's specific
representations or omissions.'" To establish liability under this approach to the fraud
on the market theory, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that the security involved in the
case was unmarketable — a security which would never have been issued but for the
(9th Cir. 1982); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 1981); In re North Am. Acceptance
Co. Securities Cases, 5t3 F. Supp. 608, 628-29 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
"i See, e.g., T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d
1330, 1331-33 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462,
471 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth.,
562 F. Supp. 1180, 1204-06 (W.D. Mo. 1983). The fraud on the market theory is based on the
language of Rule I0b-5(1) and (3), rather than Rule 10b-5(2) unlike most conventional Rule 10b-
5 actions. See Lipton v. Documentation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 744 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 814 (1985); Shores, 647 F.2d at 468-70. This theory was formulated to relieve a plaintiff asserting
a Rule 10b-5 claim from demonstrating reliance on the defendant's fraudulent activities. Shores,
647 F.2d at 468-72. Thus, this theory has been used frequently by members of a class action to
demonstrate that there is no need to show individual reliance by each member of a class upon the
allegedly misleading statements or omissions. T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333-34.
The fraud on the market theory was first adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Blackie v. Barrack,
524 F.2d 891, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1975). Since the Blackie decision this theory has been adopted to
varying degrees for Rule 10b-5 actions by five circuits. See, e.g., Lipton v. Documentation, Inc., 734
F.2d 740, 747 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 814 (1985); T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333;
Panzier v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub nom., Price Waterhouse v.
Panzier, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982); Shores, 647 F.2d at 469-70. For discussion of the development and
appropriateness of the fraud on the market theory see generally Black, Fraud on the Market: A
Criticism of Dispensing with the Reliance Requirement in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REV.
435 (1984); Rapp, Rule 10b-5 and"Fraud-on-the-Market" — Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 861 (1982); Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory, 92 HAIIV. L. REV. 1143 (1982).
12
 Three general categories of cases are found under the fraud on the market theory. See
Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730, 735-40 (W.D. Va. 1982). The first category
involves cases where a common scheme, of which defendant's misrepresentations and omissions
were a part, exists to manipulate and increase the market value of stock which results in injuring
the plaintiff who purchased stock at an artificially high price. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,
905-08 (9th Cir. 1975). The second category concerns instances where fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions and omissions in a proxy statement are employed as part of a scheme to manipulate prices to
create an unfair exchange ratio in a forced merger situation. See Shtick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974). The last category of fraud on the market cases, which
is discussed infra at notes 114-19 and accompanying text, involves cases where the defendants'
fraudulent schemes result in entirely unmarketable securities being placed on the market. See, e.g.,
T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333; Rose, 562 F. Supp. at 1201. This approach to fraud on the market
liability was first articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Shores, 647 F.2d at 470-71. This note will refer
to this third category of fraud on the market cases as the "Shores approach" to the fraud on the
market theory. It is under this Shores approach to the fraud on the market theory that opining
attorneys may be held liable to private plaintiffs. See, e.g., T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1331-33; Shores,
647 F.2d at 471; Rose, 562 F. Supp. at 1204-06.
" ' 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
"' Id. at 468-72.
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defendant's fraud. 115 Secondly, the defendant must have actively and knowingly'' par-
ticipated in a scheme to bring the unmarketable security on the market. 117 Finally, the
plaintiff must show reliance on the availability of the security on the market as an
indication of its apparent genuineness and demonstrate that as a consequence of this
reliance he suffered a loss." 8 Under this approach, courts have been willing to impose
liability on opining attorneys usually as a result of their rendering of opinions concerning
the legality of the issuance of municipal bonds."`'
Finally, the Supreme Court has expressly withheld consideration of whether section
17(a)' 2° of the Securities Act implies a private cause of action.' 2 ' A majority of the courts
"' See id. at 468, 470; Rose, 562 F. Supp. at 1201-02.
" 6 The courts have stated that plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with scienter, that
is, an intent to deceive or defraud. Shores, 647 F,2d at 471; Rose, 562 F. Supp. at 1202. The court
of appeals in Shores indicated that reckless behavior would suffice to fulfill the scienter requirement.
647 F.2d at 469.
' 17 See Shores, 647 F.2d 469; Rose; 562 F. Supp. at 1202.
" See Shores, 647 F.2d at 467-70; Rose, 562 F. Stipp. at 1202.
" 9 The impact which the Shores approach to the fraud on the market theory will have on the
liability of opining attorneys in the future remains uncertain. In recent years, the Supreme Court
has demonstrated a marked reluctance to extend the limits of private causes of action under the
federal securities laws and instead has prescribed a strict statutory construction approach to deter-
mining liability under these statutes. See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980);
Touche, Ross & CO. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Sante Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). But see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-88
(1983) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)) ("securities laws
should he construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate their remedial
purposes"). The recent development of the fraud on the market theory appears to run contrary to
this trend. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 484-85 (Randall, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the classic fraud
on the market theory put forth in Mackie arose in transactions in the open market where it is
reasonable to assume that misinformation disseminated into the marketplace will affect the price
of a security. See Blachie, 524 F.2d at 907. In this context, it seems reasonable to allow a plaintiff to
allege that he relied on the integrity of the market in buying the security and, thus, to shift the
burden of proof to the defendant to disprove reliance. Id. In Shores, however, the Fifth Circuit
applied the fraud on the market theory to the ''not entirely analogous setting of newly issued
securities on an undeveloped market." Lipton v. Documentation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 746 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 814 (1985). In this setting, it is not necessarily reasonable to assume
that misinformation will affect market price because in the case of newly issued securities, the
offeror and underwriters, not the market, set the price for which the securities will be sold. Id.; see
also Black, supra note 111, at 1156-58. Moreover, the causal nexus between the misleading infor-
mation and the plaintiff's purchase is more direct in a Mackie type of situation when the information
affects the securities price than a Shores type of case where the information goes to the legitimacy
of the issuance of the securities. See Lipton, 734 F.2d at 746; see also Rapp, supra note 1 11, at 886-
87. Thus, as the Eleventh Circuit noted in Lipton, the adoption of the Shores approach to the fraud
on the market theory represents "a context where its application is most questionable." 734 F.2d at
746. Still, this view of the fraud on the market theory has been adopted by every court which has
considered it. See, e.g., Lipton, 734 F.2d at 748; Haney, 717 F.2d at 1333; Rose, 562 F. Stipp. at
1201-03; Dekio v. Stern Bros. & Co., 540 F, Supp, 4(}6, 410-11 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Frankel v. Wyllie
& Thornhill, inc,, 537 F. Supp. 730, 735-40 (W.D. Va. 1982).
1 2 0 For a discussion of elements of section 17(a) actions, see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying
text.
121 See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.2 (1983); Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 698 (1980); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 557 n.9 (1979).
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of appeals, however, have recognized the existence of an implied private right of action
under this section. 122 Several federal courts' 23 and most commentators' 24 have asserted,
however, that recognition of an implied right of action under section 17 is inconsistent
with congressional intent and the statutory provisions of the Securities Act. 126
IL TRADI'T'IONAL VIEW OF THE LIABILITY OF OPINING SECURITIES ATTORNEYS IN SEC
INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS, RULE 2(e) PROCEEDINGS, AND CIVIL ACTIONS BROUGHT BY
PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS
Historically, the courts and the Commission subjected an opining securities attorney
to liability under the securities laws only when the lawyer actively participated in plans
to defraud investors.' 26 Under this traditional view of an opining securities lawyer's
liability, an attorney could avoid legal sanctions in cases where he functioned solely in a
professional capacity advising clients and was not a principal in schemes to defraud the
public.' 27
At common law, in rendering opinions, an attorney was required to use the care,
skill, and diligence ordinarily possessed and generally exercised by members of the legal
profession.' 29 Thus, an opining attorney was not an insurer of results or a guarantor of
the soundness of his opinions, but had only to exercise ordinary skill and diligence in
rendering them. 129
 Moreover, under tort principles, an attorney may be held liable for
breaching this standard of care only if he has a duty to protect the plaintiff from the
risk of harm which was suffered. no Traditionally, in the absence of fraud, an opining
attorney was held to owe such a duty only to those persons with whom he was in privity
of contract."' The privity requirement was based on the premise that because the
122
	 e.g., Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1982): Kusher
v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); Newman v.
Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975); Shaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir.
1975), rerl. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1231
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Baron v. Commercial & Indus. Bank of Memphis, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 96,826, at 95,308 (S.D.N.Y. April 11, 1979); Felts v. National Account Sys.
Ass'n, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 54, 64, 68 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
125 See, e.g., Landry v. All American Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 388-91 (5th Cir. 1982); In
re North Am. Acceptance Corp. Securities Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608, 618 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Mendelson
v. Capital Underwriter's Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1079-80 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
124 see, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SUpra note 47, at 817-18; L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 1148-50 (1st ed. 1983).
125 These courts and commentators have emphasized that the Securities Act is a much narrower
statute than the Exchange Act and that Congress intended civil actions to be brought only under
sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act. They believe violators of section 17 should appropriately be
subjected only to a civil injunctive or criminal action. L. Loss, suprd note 124, at 1148-50.
121 See supra notes 8-10.
127 See supra notes 8-10.
125 See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 358, 530 P.2d 589, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 627
(1975); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 831, 832 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 519, 80 S.E.2d 144, 145-46 (1954);
See also Freeman, supra note 12, at 377-87; Wade, supra note 30, at 762-65.
129 See cases cited supra note 128.
131' See cases cited supra note 128; see also Freeman, supra note 12, at 377-79; W. PROSSER, supra
note 9, at 667.
151 See, e.g., National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 206 (1879); Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Ross & Co., 225 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 444, 448 (N.Y. 1931); see also W. PROSSER, supra
note 9, at 667-68.
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attorney's obligation to perform competently arose entirely out of the contractual rela-
tionship between attorney and client, any liability for breach of this obligation should
run only to the contracting parties.'"
This legal requirement of privity was established by the United States Supreme
Court in the 1879 case of National Savings Bank v. Ward.'" In this case, an attorney, at
the request of his client, conducted a title search and provided the client with a written
opinion that the land in question was held by the client in fee simple.'" Relying on the
attorney's opinion, a bank loaned money to the attorney's client for which the land in
question was collatera1. 133 After the client defaulted on the loan payments, the bank
discovered that the title to the land was worthless." In considering a malpractice action
which the bank had brought against the lawyer, the Court stated that "Dille only safe
rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract; if we go one
step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty." 137 Therefore, the Court
held that, in the absence of fraud or collusion, lawyers could be held liable for negligent
performance of their duties only to those with whom they were in privity of contract.'"
The vast majority of courts treating this issue of opining attorneys' liability to third
parties under common law followed the Ward holding.' 39 Thus, apart from malpractice
actions brought by clients, opining attorneys were historically exposed to liability under
common law only for legal opinions containing intentional misrepresentations or rep-
resentations made for which there was no reasonable basis for their accuracy.
The liability of attorneys under the federal securities laws was similarly limited.
Under these statutes, the SEC and the courts traditionally imposed sanctions and civil
liability on opining attorneys only where the lawyers were active participants in fraud-
ulent investment schemes. 140 Thus, SEC injunctive actions were historically only instituted
152 See, e.g., National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 206 (1879); Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Ross & Co., 225 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 444, 448 (N.Y. 1931); see also, W. PROSSER, supra
note 9, at 667-68.
iss 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
134 Id. at 196.
1 " Id. at 198.
' 36 /d. at 198.
' '" Id. at 203 (citations omitted). In the landmark case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Ross &
Co., 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 444 (N.Y. 1931), Judge Cardozo similarly stated:
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many callings other than
an audit. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to the validity of municipal bonds with
the knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the notice of the public, will become
liable to investors if they have overlooked a statute or a decision to the same extent as
if the controversy were one between client and adviser.
Id. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
' 3 ' Ward, 100 U.S. at 204.
139 For modern cases following Ward, see Amey, Inc. v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt,
P.A., 367 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. App. 1979); Levine v. Graphic Scanning Corp., 87 A.D.2d 755, 755,
448 N.Y.S.2d 693, 693 (1982); First Mun. Leasing v. Blankenship, 648 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. App.
1983). See also Landau, supra note 1, at 27; W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 667.
Ha See, e.g., Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1053 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); United States v. Crosby,
294 F.2d 928, 938 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied sub nom. Mittleman v. United States, 368 U.S. 984
(1962); SEC v. A.G. Bellin Securities Corp., 171 F. Supp. 233, 235-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Morris
MacSchwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347, 370-71 (1960), modified, 40 S.E.C. 459 (1961); In re James DeWitt, 38
S.E.C. 879, 881 (1959). See also Jenkins, supra note 11, at 510; Leiman, supra note 11, at 278-79;
Lowenfils, supra note 11, at 413-16.
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against repeat or notorious violators of the federal securities laws."' The 1959 case of
SEC v. A.G. Bellin Securities Corp. 142 is typical of the cases in which the issuance of an
injunction was predicated on a finding of direct participation by an attorney in a fraud-
ulent scheme. In that case, an attorney had purchased the stock certificates and records
of a shell corporationl" and participated in making the arrangements by which unre-
gistered shares of the corporation were illegally distributed to the public) ." The defen-
dant argued that his actions were taken on behalf of and pursuant to instructions from
his clients and that he was therefore exempt from liability) ." The federal district court
found, however, that the evidence did not support the attorney's contention and held
that he was a principal in the fraudulent transaction. 118 Therefore, the court permanently
enjoined the lawyer from further violations of the Securities Act. 147
Administrative proceedings under Rule 2(e) were also instituted by the SEC against
opining securities attorneys only in cases involving intentional and flagrant violations of
the federal securities laws. 198 For instance, in the 1959 case of In re James DeWitt,t 49 a
lawyer, acting pursuant to a power of attorney, knowingly filed a notification under
Regulation A of the Securities Act which contained false financial statements. 18° DeWitt
also rendered an opinion to his client authorizing him to sell the shares covered by the
notification even though the lawyer was aware that the required waiting period for such
a sale had not passed. 151 Furthermore, the lawyer requested and received money from
his client under the false pretense that the money would be used illegally to induce SEC
employees to act in a manner favorable to the client's interests.'" On the basis of these
findings of egregious fraudulent conduct by the attorney, DeWitt was permanently
disqualified from practicing securities law.'"
141 See also Jenkins, supra note 1 1, at 510-11; Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus.
Law. 1153,1156 (1972); Leiman, supra note 11, at 278-79; Lowenfils, supra note 11, at 413-16.
112
 171 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
145
 A shell corporation "is a non-operating company with stock owned by the general public.
Shells come into business when an operating company ceases doing business or when it spins off
into a subsidiary." Orlanski, Going Public Through the Backdoor and the Shell Game, 58 VA. L. REV.
1451,1451 (1972).
1" A.G. Bellin, 171 F. Supp. at 235.
145 Id.
"6 Id.
147 Id. at 237.
118 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 14, at 642-44; Kemp, supra note 78, at 40-44; Klein, The SEC
and the Legal Profession, 11 INST. ON SEC. REG. 597,608-12 (1979); Marsh, supra note 71, at 990. In
fact, Rule 2(e) was not used to suspend an attorney from appearing before the Commission until
1950. Id. The first Rule 2(e) proceeding of record instituted against an attorney was In re Albert J.
Fleishman, 37 S.E.C. 832 (1950). Up to 1960, only four Rule 2(e) actions were brought against
lawyers. Marsh, supra note 71, at 990. Commentators have attributed this infrequent early use of
the Rule 2(e) proceeding to the Commission's early philosophy of self regulation with respect to
the legal profession. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 639 n.7.
' 49 38 S.E.C. 879 (1959).
' 50 Id. at 880.
IS' Id.
152 Id.
139 Id. For examples of other Rule 2(e) actions prior to 1970 whiCh resulted in suspensions for
egregiously fraudulent conduct sec In re Marshall Stewart, Securities Act Release No. 4829 (April
29, 1966) (attorney who made intentionally false filings with the Commission permanently disqual-
ified from practicing before the SEC); In re Morris MacSchwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960), modified, 40
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Finally, as in injunctive and Rule 2(e) actions, courts traditionally held opining
securities attorneys liable to private plaintiffs under the federal securities laws only when
the lawyers actively participated in fraudulent investment plans.'" In Katz v. Amos Treat
& Co., 155 for example, an attorney for an underwriter misrepresented to a potential
investor that the SEC registration of securities to be underwritten by his client was
substantially completed and that the stock was a safe investment.' 56 On the basis of these
findings, the Second Circuit held the attorney had placed his client in a position to
tackle Katz [the investor] for his money" and, thus, could be held liable as a principal
for violations of the registration and antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 157
In contrast, in cases where lawyers had issued incorrect opinions but had not been
found to be principals in fraudulent schemes, courts imposed no liability on the opining
attorneys. 199 In the 1965 case of Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co., 159 an attorney had
participated in the revival of a dormant corporation and the alteration of its capital
structure, and had been responsible for the preparation of the corporate minutes. 19° In
connection with these activities, the attorney had given an erroneous opinion to the
corporate officers that its securities were exempt from the registration provisions of
section 5 of the Securities Act and could be legally sold to the public without registra-
t ion. 161 When the securities proved worthless, purchasers of the stock brought an action
against several persons, including the attorney. L62 Despite the attorney's extensive in-
volvement in the corporation and its sale of the stock, the court held that the attorney
was a "stranger to the illegal sales" and, thus, could not be held liable to the share-
holders, 165
Likewise, in Nicewarner v. Bleavins,'" shareholders brought an action alleging viola-
tions of the federal securities laws against an attorney whose client had illegally sold
them unregistered securities.'" The court found that the lawyer had reason to anticipate
the public offering, knew . no registration was in effect, should have known that the
instruments sold were securities and was in a position to see that the plaintiffs needed
the protection of the Securities Act.' 66 Yet, the court held that since the defendant had
acted only in an advisory capacity as an attorney, he could not be held liable to the
purchasers.I 67
S.E.C. 459 (1961) (attorney who rendered legal opinions with no factual or legal basis permanently
disqualified from practicing before the SEC).
154 See Jenkins, supra note 11, at 510-11; Johnson, supra note 14, at 431-44; Klein, supra note
148, at 608-12; Leiman, supra note II, at 278-79; Lowenfils, supra note 11, at 411- 16; see also
Marsh, supra note 71, at 987-93.
155 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969).
156 Id. at 1052.
151 Id. at 1053, 1055.
1 58 See, e.g., Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Colo. 1965); Wonneman v.
Stratford Securities Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1191,460 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). See generally authorities cited supra note 154.





164 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
' 65 Id. at 263.
166 1d. at 266.
167 Id.
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The traditional limitation on the liability of opining attorneys under common law
and the federal securities statutes was inexorably linked to the historic view that a lawyer
owed "unremitting loyalty" to the interests of his client.'" As one commentator noted
in 1969, "Nile law, so far, is very clear. The lawyers' responsibility is exclusively to their
own client."'" As recently as 1962 in the case of American Finance Co.,'" the SEC set
forth this traditional view of the role and responsibilities of an attorney in the securities
area by contrasting the attorney's role with the role of an accountant. The Commission
stated:
Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting as the client's
advisor, defender, advocate, and confidant enters into a personal relationship
in which his principal concern is with the interests and rights of his client.
The requirement of the Act of certification by an independent accountant,
on the other hand, is intended to secure for the benefit of public investors
the detached objectivity of a disinterested person."'
Thus, under this historic view of the role and responsibilities of a securities lawyer, an
opining attorney had a duty not to participate directly in a securities fraud. 12 At all
other times, however, the lawyer's performance of his duties was to be controlled by his
"unremitting loyalty" to the interests of his clients." 5 The role of the opining securities
attorney was akin to that of a scrivener whose function was to put the thoughts of a
client in the proper legal form."a Therefore, the courts and the SEC would not impose
sanctions or civil liability on attorneys who acted solely in an advisory capacity and were
not principals in a scheme to defraud investors. 15
ILL MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIABILITY OF OPINING SECURITIES ATTORNEYS
UNDER 'rim FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the SEC, the ABA, and the courts began to take
a more expansive view of the role and responsibilities of opining securities attorneys. 16
One indication of this change occurred in the area of professional ethics with the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility's (Code) differentiation between the role and re-
sponsibilities of an attorney as an advocate and as an advisor.'" The Code noted that as
an advocate, an attorney deals with past conduct and must take the facts as he finds
them.I" Thus, as an advocate, an attorney should resolve all doubts in favor of his client
and "urge any permissible construction of the law favorable to his client, without regard
to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the construction will prevail." 19 As
165 See, e.g., Frank, supra note 12, at 337-338; Jenkins, supra note 11, at 510-11; Lennart, .supra
note 11, at 277-79; Lowentils, supra note 11, at 415-16; Sommer, supra note 2, at 83,689-90.
'" Freeman, supra note 12, at 639.
' 70 40 S.E.C. 1043 (1962).
171 Id. at 1049.
"2 See authorities cited supra note 168.
' 75 See authorities cited supra note 168.
' 74 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
175
 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
176 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
' 77 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL. RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3, 7-4, and 7-5 (1985).
'm Id. EC 7-3.




an advisor, on the other hand, an attorney is involved in determining future conduct
and relationships. 18° According to the Code, the attorney's role as advisor is to give his
professional opinion as to what the ultimate decision of a court might be regarding the
applicable law and the practical consequences of such a decision on his client's' This
differentiation between the role of an attorney as advocate and as advisor in the Code
indicates that, at least in the view of the ABA, an opining securities attorney should not
blindly follow the dictates of his clients, but instead should take a more objective and
independent role in rendering opinions.'"
This changing view of the role and responsibilities of opining securities attorneys
during the early 1970's is further manifested by the issuance of Formal Opinion No.
335 on February 1, 1974, by the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility (Committee).'" This opinion focused on the standard of factual inquiry and in-
vestigation that should be followed by attorneys in rendering opinions relating to the
sale of unregistered securities.'" In the opinion, the Committee stated that an opining
securities attorney is not justified in assuming facts as represented to him by a client or
in basing an opinion on the assumption that such facts are correct.' 85 The Committee
emphasized that before issuing an, opinion based on facts furnished by a client, an
attorney should take steps to ensure that the client understands exactly what facts the
attorney has requested and that the attorney understands precisely what the client has
told him.'" According to the Committee, if any of the alleged facts supplied by a client
or the alleged facts taken as a whole are incomplete, suspect, inconsistent, or open to
question, either on their face or on the basis of other facts known to the attorney, then
the lawyer has a responsibility to make further inquiry into the validity of the facts.' 87
The extent of the inquiry, the Committee continued, depends on the circumstances of
the particular case.' 88 In instances where the lawyer determines that further inquiry
would still not satisfy him or that any material deficiency in the facts provided him
remains, the Committee stated that the lawyer must refuse to give the opinion. L89 In the
conclusion of Opinion No. 335, the Committee explicitly recognized that the role of the
opining securities attorney was to give his considered independent opinion of the law and
that "while the responsibility of the lawyer is to his client, he must not he oblivious of
the extent to which others may be affected if he is derelict in fulfilling that responsibil-
ity."'"
18° Id. EC 7-3.
,81 Id.
182 Id. EC 7-3, 7-4, 7-5; see also, Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 800-02; Jennings, The Corporate
Lawyer's Responsibilities and Liabilities in Rendering Legal Opinions, 30 Bus. LAW. 73, 74-75 (1975). In
Westlake v. Abrams, a district court relying on EC 7-3 differentiated between the roles and potential
liability of an attorney serving as an advocate and as an advisor. 656 F. Supp. 1330, 1350 (N.D. Ga.
1983).
'" See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (Revised)
(1982) (tax law opinions in tax shelter investment offerings).
184 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335, at I (1974).
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This transformation in the role and responsibilities of opining securities attorneys
was also demonstrated in a speech given by SEC Commissioner Sommer entitled "The
Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer." 19 ' In contrast to the views put forth
by the SEC in American Finance Co.' 92 twelve years earlier, Sommer stated:
I would suggest in securities matters (other than those where advocacy is
clearly proper) the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin to
that of the auditor than that of the advocate. This means several things. It
means he will have to exercise a measure of independence that is perhaps
uncomfortable if he is also the close counselor of management in other
matters, often including business decisions. It means he will have to be acutely
cognizant of his responsibility to the public who engage in securities trans-
actions that would never have come about were it not for his professional
presence. It means he will have to adopt the healthy skepticism towards the
representations of management which a good auditor must adopt.'"'
Moreover, during the 1970's, the SEC also suggested that securities attorneys not
only had a duty to advise clients not to engage in fraudulent activities, but also if a client
refused to follow this advice and intended to violate the securities statutes, the attorney
was required to resign and to notify the Commission about the client's conduct.'" Under
this view of a securities lawyer's responsibilities under the securities laws, the lawyer had
an obligation to "blow the whistle" on a client.' 95
 Thus, attorneys were required to police
and to ensure compliance by their clients with the federal securities laws.' 9°
Consistent with the ABA's and the SEC's more expansive view of the role and
responsibilities of opining securities attorneys, the courts during this time period also
broadened the scope of liability of opining lawyers under the federal securities laws.' 97
191
 Summer, supra note 2, at 83,688.
"2 40 S.E.C. 1043 (1962). For discussion of this case, see supra notes 163-64 and accompanying
text.
"" Sommer, supra note 2, at 83,689-90. For a collection of various statements by other SEC
officials expressing views similar to those of Commissioner Sommer, see Mathews, Liabilities of
Lawyers, supra note 15, at 115-16. For articles written by commissioners during this period reflecting
the Summer's view of the changing role of securities attorneys, see Sommer, Professional Responsibility:
How Did We Get Here, 30 Bus. LAw. 95 (1975); Sonde, Professional Responsibility: A New Religion or
the Old Gospel, 24 EMORY Li. 829 (1975); Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1973).
114 The SEC's changing view of securities attorneys' duties was put forth in its filing of the
National Student Marketing complaint. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1i 93,360 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972). For a discussion of the SEC's
filing of the complaint and the litigation which followed it, see infra notes 218-59 and accompanying
text.
'"' See National Student Marketing (complaint), at 91,913-15 —17; see, e.g., Gruenbaum, supra note
2, at 796-98; Lipman, supra note 23, at 462-68.
"9" National Student Marketing (complaint), at 91,913-15 —17; see, e.g., Gruenbaum, supra note 2,
at 796-98; Lipman, supra note 23, at 462-68.
' 97 SEC civil injunctive actions include, for example, SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1029 (2d
Cir. 1978); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.,
402 F. Supp. 641, 648-50 (D.D.C. 1975). For a collection of all SEC injunctive actions brought
against opining attorneys during this time, see Rowe, supra note 11, at 384-407. Rule 2(e) actions
instituted against opining lawyers include: In re Gibson, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (C01)1182,334, at 82,426 (Dec. 7, 1981); Attorneys' Opinion Letters, [1980 Transfer Binder]
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For the first time, the courts as well as the Commission were willing to impose judicial
and administrative sanctions and civil liability against attorneys who had acted solely in
a professional capacity as advisors if the courts or the SEC determined that the attorneys'
had not fulfilled their responsibilities to the investing public. 198 The following subsection
will examine the expansion during the 1970's in the number and scope of injunctive
actions the SEC brought against opining securities attorneys. It will also look at more
recent court decisions in injunction cases which appear to limit the scope of activities for
which an opining attorney may have an injunction entered against him.
A. SEC Injunctive Actions
Beginning in the late 1960's, the SEC brought injunctive actions against opining
attorneys with increasing frequency. 199 Along with the increase in the number of injunc-
tive actions filed by the Commission, there was also a shift in the activities for which the
SEC brought these suits.':* Where as injunctive actions had traditionally been instituted
only against attorneys who were principals willfully engaged in schemes to defraud
investors,'" the SEC began bringing injunctive actions against attorneys who had acted
solely in professional capacities as advisors to their clients without any direct interest in
the activities complained of other than the ordinary fee. 202 In these cases, the Commission
usually charged that the attorney had "aided and abetted" 20' the federal securities laws
violations of a client by rendering incorrect legal opinions which had resulted in injuring
investors."
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,876 at 84,325-27 ( June I, 1981); In re Hodgin [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,334, at 82,426-27 (Sept. 27, 1979); In re O'Neil, Securities
Release No. 33-5938 (Aug. 3, 1978). Private damage actions instituted against opining attorneys
under the federal securities laws include: T.J. Raney & Sons v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation
Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Stokes v. Lokken,
644 F.2d 779, 783-85 (8th Cir. 1981); Cronin v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856,
862 (10th Cir. 1980); Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 54, 67-68 (N.D. Miss.
1978). For authorities discussing this transformation, see Jenkins, supra note 11, at 511; Leiman,
supra note 11, at 279; Lowenfils, supra note II, at 418-19; Sommer, supra note 2, at 83,687-89.
j" See supra note 197.
194 See, Karmel, supra note 141, at 156 (1972); Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, supra note
36, at 969.
200 See Jenkins, supra note 11, at 511-13; Karmel, supra note 141, at 1156; Lowenfils, supra note
11, 419-23.
2111 See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
202 See, e.g., SEC v. Haswell, 654 F.2d 698, 698-99 (10th Cir. 1981); SEG v. Coven, 581 F.2d
1020, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1045-46 (2d
Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management Dynamics, 515 F.2d 801, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 487-89 (2d Cir. 1968);
SEC v. Adler, 11980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1197,674, at 98,555-56 (D.D.C. Nov.
5, 1980); SEC v. Cohen, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1197,335, at 97,221-
22 (D.D.C. 1980); SEC v. Century Mortgage Co., 470 F. Supp. 300, 309-10 (D. Utah 1978); SEC
v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 648-50 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. Century
Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1193,232, at 91,443
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1971).
"' See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text for discussion of aiding and abetting.
204 See cases cited supra note 202; see also Leiman, supra note 11, at 279, 284 n.18; Parker, supra
note 110, at 524.
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1. The Emergence of Opining Attorneys' Liability for Solely Advisory Activities: The
Development of Disclosure Obligations and a Negligence Standard
In the 1968 case of SEC v. Frank 205 the Commission for the first time brought an
injunctive action against an attorney based solely on his actions in preparing documents
for his client. 206 While the Frank case concerned the liability of an attorney for false
statements contained in a prospectus rather than in a legal opinion, the decision dem-
onstrated the Second Circuit's willingness to enter a permanent injunction against an
attorney for aiding and abetting violations of the federal securities laws when the lawyer
had acted solely in a professional capacity as an advisor to his client. 202 In Frank, the
Second Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that the role of a securities attorney
was to be a "scrivener" of the thoughts of his clients.'" Noting the important function
of documents such as legal opinions in the securities area,'" Judge Friendly, writing for
the Second Circuit, stated, "a lawyer, no more than others can escape liability for fraud
by closing his eyes to what he saw and could reasonably understand." 21 ° Thus, the court
held that if the attorney had been provided with information that even a nonexpert
would have realized was a false representation and still included it in his client's pro-
spectus, a permanent injunction could be granted.'"
The principles enunciated by the Second Circuit in Frank were explicitly applied to
opining attorneys in SEC v. Century Investment Transfer Corp."' In that case, decided in
November, 1971, a New York federal district court granted a preliminary injunction
against an attorney who had prepared a misleading legal opinion on the grounds that
he had aided and abetted a fraudulent scheme to distribute unregistered securities."s
The attorney, Caldwell, had prepared opinion letters stating that the issuance of securities
by four shell corporations was exempt from registration under section 393 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act, which provide exemptions for
shares issued partly for cash and partly for claims against a debtor in Chapter XI
bankruptcy proccedings. 214 Because the shares had been issued solely for cash, however,
the court found that Caldwell's opinion letters went "enough beyond being mere mistakes
in legal judgment to constitute probable violations of the anti—fraud provisions of the
securities laws. "215 Because Caldwell's issuance of these knowingly misleading opinion
letters had been crucial to the distribution of the unregistered securities,"'" the court
205
 388 F.2d 486 (2d. Cir. 1968).
2°6 1d. at 488. The SEC alleged that the attorney, Frank, had violated the antifraud provisions
of section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act because of his actions
in preparing an offering circular which allegedly contained material misrepresentations. Id. at 487.
For explanation of sections 10(b) and 17(a), see notes 39-70 and accompanying text.
2' 7 See Johnson, supra note 14, at 651-52.
208 Frank, 388 F.2d at 488.
2°9 Id. at 489.
2101d.
2 " Id. The Frank court, however, refused to sustain the lower court's issuance of a temporary
injunction which was based solely on SEC affidavits. Id. at 492-93.










found the evidence sufficient to find Caldwell to be an "aider and abettor" of the
fraudulent scheme and to grant the SEC's motion for a temporary injunction. 2 "
While the courts in Frank and Century Investment Corp. had stated that opining
securities attorneys could be found guilty of aiding and abetting violations of the federal
securities laws based solely on their activities in advising their clients, it was the SEC's
filing of the National Student Marketing complaint212 on February 2, 1972, which focused
the attention of the securities bar on the dramatic changes occurring in the liability of
opining attorneys under the federal securities laws. 212 The National Student Marketing
complaint represented the first time that the SEC had instituted injunctive actions against
members of large, prominent law firms with significant corporate practices for actions
taken solely while representing a client. 22°
In its National Student Marketing complaint, the SEC alleged that the law firms of
White & Case and Lord, Bissell & Brook, various partners at these firms, and a private
practitioner had violated various antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws by
issuing improper opinions. 22 ' Moreover, the SEC also alleged that these attorneys should
not only have refused to give these opinions and advised their clients that their proposed
conduct would violate the securities laws, but also if their clients refused to follow this
advice, the lawyers had a duty to resign and to inform the SEC about their clients'
actions.222 To members of the securities bar, the complaint represented an attack on the
traditional standard of care and priorities of duties owed by opining securities lawyers. 225
The SEC's charges against the firms and their partners were based largely upon
actions they had taken in connection with the merger of Interstate National Corporation
.(Interstate) with the National Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC). 224 According to
the terms of the merger agreement between the two companies, as a condition precedent
to the consummation of the merger, Lord, Bissell & Brook, as Interstate's counsel, was
to render a legal opinion stating that all actions performed by Interstate in connection
with the merger had been validly taken and that no violations of federal or state laws or
regulations had occurred to the knowledge of counsel. 225 White & Case was also required
to issue a similar opinion to Interstate. 226 Another condition precedent to the completion
237 Id.
210 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder} FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) II 93,360 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 1972).
210 Two weeks after the filing of the National Student Marketing complaint, the Wall Street Journal
described the complaint as "the best read document since Gone With The Wind." Wall St. J., Feb. 15,
1972, at I, col. 1.
220 Note, Duties and Obligations, supra note 90, at 137.
221 Id. White & Case and one of its partners, Jay Epley III, were charged with violating section
17(a) of the Securities Act and sections 10, 13(a) and 14(a) of the Exchange Act. Id. at 91,913-15
—17. Lord, Bissel & Brook and two of its partners, Max E. Mayer and Louis F. Shayer, were accused
of violating section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-
5 promulgated thereunder. Id, at 91,913-16 —18. Private attorney Robert Katz was charged with
violating section I7(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.
Id. at 91,913 —18.
222 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1193,360, at 91,913-15 —18 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 1972).
225 See, e.g., Lowenfils, supra note 11, at 421; Patterson, supra note 12, at 1251-55; Sommers,
supra note 2, at 83,687.
224 National Student Marketing (complaint), at 91,931-15 —20.
225 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 690 (D.D.C. 1978).
2261d.
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of the merger was receipt by each company of a "comfort letter" from the other's
independent public accountants stating that the accountants had no reason to believe
that the unaudited financial statements for the company in question were not prepared
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles or required any adjustment
in order that the results be fairly presented. 22 ' The merger agreement terms, along with
the unaudited interim financial statements of both companies over the preceding twenty-
one months, were included in the proxy materials sent to the shareholders of both
companies to secure their approval of the merger. 228
During the closing meeting of the merger, however, the executives and attorneys
for both companies were informed by Peat, Marwick & Mitchell (PMM), the accountants
for NSMC, that PMM would disclose in its comfort letter that the $702,000 profit figure
for the nine month period ending on May 31, 1969, which had been reported by NSMC
in its unaudited financial statements, had not been arrived at in accordance with generally
accepted accounting procedures. 229 Instead of these reported profits, PMM stated that
NSMC had actually incurred net operating losses of approximately $80,000 during this
period 239
After PMM's disclosure that it would issue a comfort letter which would not conform
to the requirements of the merger agreement, 23 i the executives and attorneys for both
companies conferred separately and finally decided to proceed with the merger. 232 The
lawyers for White & Case and Lord, Bissell & Brook then issued their respective opinion
letters and the merger was completed- 23 ' After the completion of the merger and PMM's
disclosure of the inaccurate nature of NSMC's interim financials, Lord, Bissell, & Brook
issued an opinion that the offering qualified for Rule I 33's broker exemption to section
5's registration requirements. 234 This opinion did not mention the need for adjusting
227 Id.
223 Id. at 690-91.
229 Id. at 691-93. In its comfort letter, PMM stated that three problems existed with respect to
the interim financial statement for the nine month period ending May 31, 1969. First, a change of
$500,000 was required for adjusting the amortization of deferred costs in the May statement to
eliminate all costs for programs substantially completed or which started 12 months or more prior
to May 31, 1969. Secondly, in August, 1969, NSMC's management wrote off receivables in the
amount of $300,000. The uncollectibility of this amount could have been determined at May 31,
1969, and should have been reflected in that date's financial statements. Finally, $84,000 in acqui-
sition costs for projects which NSMC decided riot to pursue were transferred from additional paid-
in capital to general and administrative costs. These changes should have been so transferred as of
May 31, 1969. Id. at 692 n.18.
""Id. at 691-93. Also, during the closing, but before the completion of the merger, PMM
informed Jay Epley Ill, the White & Case partner in charge of the merger, that it would add
another paragraph to its comfort letter urging disclosure of NSMC's corrected nine month financial
statement and resolicitation of the shareholders of both companies. Id. at 695-96.
231 Id. at 693-94.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 694.
239
	 at 697-98. Rule 133(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1969), was promulgated by the Commission
under the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77kk (1982). Under Rule 133(d), exemptions for certain
stock transactions from the registration requirements of the Securities Act were available if the
stock was sold in a broker's transaction and if the seller did not engage in certain prohibited conduct
in selling and trading the securities. 17 C.F.R. § 230.33 (1969). While Rule 133 was rescinded
effective January 1, 1973, it was in effect during the period in which the National Student Marketing
merger occurred.
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NSMC's interim financials or for publicly disclosing PMM's comfort letter before the
stock could be sold so that persons purchasing the stock would be aware of NSMC's true
financial position.225
The final charges in the SEC's complaint concerned an opinion of counsel issued
by attorney Robert Katz, counsel to individuals who had purchased Compujob, Inc.,
then a wholly owned subsidiary of NSMC, from NSMC.2" In the opinion letter, Katz
stated that it was legal under New York law for NSMC to backdate the Compujob
transaction from November 29, 1969, when it was completed, to August 31, 1969. 252
This legal opinion, which was submitted to White & Case, was written to satisfy PMM
that the sale of Compujob — and NSMC's gain therefrom — could be included in NSMC
financial statements for the fiscal year ending August 31, 1969. 2"
In considering motions for summary judgment in the action against Robert Katz,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia focused on the issue of
whether Katz had aided and abetted violations of the federal securities laws by issuing
his opinion regarding the legality of backdating the Compujob transaction. 229 For the
purpose of considering whether the three requirements for an aiding and abetting
violation had been established, the district court assumed that a primary violation of the
federal securities laws had occurred and focused on whether Katz had acted with scienter
and had provided substantial assistance to the achievement of the primary violation. 240
In arguing that his conduct did not constitute a secondary violation of the federal
securities laws, Katz emphasized that his participation in the transaction had been limited
to issuing a legal opinion on a narrow issue of law."' He further stated that his opinion
was technically accurate and that "economic reality is a matter for the accountants, and
that as a lawyer, he was only obligated to look at the formal aspects of the transaction." 242
In rejecting this argument, the court stated that because Katz was involved in drafting
the document for the sale of Compujob, the court would not allow him to close his eyes
to the "commercial substance" of the transaction. 245 Therefore, the court found Katz
either actually knew that NSMC was involved in a fraudulent scheme or "recklessly
ignored what should have been readily apparent. "244 Finally, since PMM relied on Katz's
opinion in including the Comprujob transaction in the 1969 fiscal year figures, the court
found that the "substantial assistance" element of aiding and abetting had been satisfied
235
	
v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682,697-98 (D.D.C. 1978).
236
	




	 White & Case submitted a similar opinion to NSMC stating that it agreed with Katz's
opinion and that NSMC was entitled to rely upon it. Id.
259
	
at 643. For a discussion of the elements of an aiding and abetting action, see supra notes
56-63 and accompanying text.
24° 402 F. Supp. at 648.
241 Id. at 646.
242 Id. at 647.
243
	
at 648. The judge stated:
This court rejects the proposition that a member of the bar can seek refuge behind a
legal technicality elevating form over substance when he is a party to and fully familiar
with the circumstances which indicate that an illusory transaction is being undertaken
which could be utilized to mislead third parties.
Id.
299 Id. at 650.
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and, thus, Katz's motion for summary judgment was dismissed. 245 On April 28, 1977,
Katz consented to an entry against him of a judgment permanently enjoining him from
further violations of the federal securities laws. 246
On May 16, 1977, Marion Jay Epley III, the White & Case partner in charge of the
National Student Marketing merger with Interstate, consented to the entry of a per-
manent injunction against him without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations against
him. 217 Epley also agreed not to practice before the Commission for 180 days and agreed
to limitations on his issuance of opinions. 245 Also, on this date, White & Case and the
SEC agreed to a settlement order. 249 Under this order, White & Case agreed to "adopt,
effectuate, and maintain" certain procedures in connection with their representation of
securities clients. 250 Many of these procedures concerned steps which White & Case
would be required to follow when issuing opinions of counsel in the future.251
The final proceeding of the National Student Marketing action concerned whether
Lord, Bissel & Brook had aided and abetted violations of the federal securities laws
through their actions as Interstate's general counsel. The district court first found that
the closing of the NSMC and Interstate merger and the sale of NSMC stock by former
Interstate shareholders after the receipt of the PMM comfort letter constituted primary
violations of the federal securities laws. 252 The court also held that the attorneys knew
that interstate shareholders and the investing public were unaware of the inaccuracies
in the NSMC financial statement, yet did not object to the closing of the merger.253
According to the court, this level of knowledge satisfied the scienter requirement of
aiding and abetting. 254 In deciding whether the attorneys' conduct had provided sub-
stantial assistance to the primary violations, however, the court found that the attorneys'
issuance of legal opinions did not play a major part in the closing of the merger, but
was only one of many conditions needed to consummate the merger. 255 Ruling that this
situation was not a ease where the opinion of counsel concerned a specific issue and was
undeniably relied on in completing the transaction, the court stated that the legal opinion
issued by Lord, Bissel & Brook concerning the merger did not provide substantial
assistance to the primary violation. 256 Thus, the court held that Lord, Bisset & Brook
24 ' Id. at 649-50.
246 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 687 n.2 (D.D.C. 1978). Katz
also agreed to restrain from rendering legal opinions in the securities area which he knew or
reasonably should have known were false. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civ. Act. No.
72-225 (1).D.C. Apr. 28, 1977).
2 ' 7 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp. [1977-1978 Transfer 13inder] FED. Sec. L. REP.
(CCH) 'U 96,027, at 91,601 (1).D.C. May 2. 1977).
246 1d, at 91,601-02.
249 Id. at 91,601.
2 '° Id.
251 Id. For example, White & Case agreed not to issue a legal opinion in connection with
securities until the partner who rendered it had consulted with two other partners of the firm. Id.
at 91,600. White & Case also agreed not to deliver a legal opinion if it was aware that any material
representation made by client was not true or correct in the light of the circumstances under which
it is made. Id.
252 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 712 (D.D.C. 1978).
2" /d. at 712-13.
254 1d. at 710-12.
2" 1d. at 714.
256 Id. at 714-15.
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and its partners had not aided and abetted the violations of the federal securities laws
through their issuance of legal opinions concerning the merger and sale of stock. 257
While Lord, Bissel & Brook's issuance of opinions was found not to have substantially
assisted violations of the securities laws, the district court did hold that the failure of the
law firm and its attorneys to provide notice of PMM's disclosures to Interstate's share-
holders before the closing did satisfy this element of aiding and abetting. 258 Refusing to
determine the precise contours of a securities attorney's disclosure obligations, 259 the
court found that the lawyers' failure to take any steps whatsoever to delay the closing of
the merger and to ensure that this information was disclosed to Interstate's shareholders
provided substantial assistance to their client's violations of the securities laws. 26° While
Lord, Bissel & Brook and its lawyers were found guilty of aiding and abetting violations,
the court did not issue an injunction against these parties on the grounds that the SEC
had not established the reasonable likelihood of future illegal conduct by the defen-
dants.261
Although the National Student Marketing litigation failed to resolve the issue of an
opining lawyer's duty to report a client's violation of the securities laws to the SEC, the
case demonstrated to the legal community the changes in opining attorneys' responsi-
bilities and liabilities which had occurred during the 1970's .262 After the National Student
Marketing decision, a securities attorney's issuance of an erroneous legal opinion or
"silence" at the closing of a merger clearly could constitute a violation of the securities
laws.263 Thus, the case firmly established that opining attorneys may be held liable as
aiders and abettors solely for actions taken in a professional capacity as a client's adVisor.
While the National Student Marketing action received most of the public attention, it
was the 1973 decision of the Second Circuit in SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 264 with its establish-
ment of a negligence standard, which had the greatest potential for expanding the scope
of activities for which a permanent injunction could be issued against an opining secu-
rities attorney. In Spectrum, an attorney, Shiffman, acting as counsel to a corporation,
rendered an opinion incorrectly stating that certain individuals who had received Spec-
trum stock in a merger could sell these securities in a transaction exempt from the
registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act. 265 As a result of this opinion,
the SEC instituted an injunctive action against Shiffman alleging that he had aided and
abetted violations of the federal securities laws. 266 In reversing the lower court's dismissal
257 Id .
"' Id. at 714-15.
255 Id. at 713-14. Thus, the court failed to resolve the issue of whether an opining lawyer has
a duty under the securities laws to blow the whistle on a client.
260 Id .
261 Id. at 716-17.
262 Id. at 714. In this context, the court stated:
The filing of the complaint in this proceeding generated significant interest and an
almost overwhelming amount of comment within the legal profession on the scope of
a securities lawyer's. obligations to his client and to the investing public. The very
initiation of this action, therefore, has provided a necessary and worthwhile impetus
for the profession's recognition and assessment of its responsibilities in this area.
Id.
263 Id. at 713.
264 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973),
265 Id. at 539.
266 Id. at 536.
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of this action, the Second Circuit emphasized the "unique and pivotal role" opining
attorneys play in the securities area and the need for the public to be able to rely on
attorneys' securities opinions. 267 In light of the important functions fulfilled by these
lawyers, the court of appeals held that, in an SEC injunctive action, an opining securities
attorney could be found guilty of aiding and abetting violations of the federal securities
laws for simple negligence in issuing an opinion concerning an exemption from regis-
tration. 266 Thus, the Spectrum decision greatly expanded the potential liability of opining
attorneys in SEC injunctive actions. After this decision, not only could these lawyers have
injunctions entered against them solely for actions taken in advising a client, but also
the SEC only had to establish that the lawyer should have known that his opinion would
be used by a client to further violations of the securities laws. 269
Three years later, in SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp.,2" the Second Circuit,
despite the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Hochfelder,"' again held that in a
SEC injunctive proceeding an opining securities lawyer could be found guilty of aiding
and abetting upon a showing of negligence. 272 In Universal Major Industries, an attorney
issued opinions of counsel erroneously stating that no registration under Section 5 of
the Securities Act was required for the transfer of common stock to debenture holders
who had exercised their conversion privilege. 2" In bringing an injunctive action against
the opining attorney, the Commission stated that the lawyer "knew or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known that the securities were not exempt from registration"
and, thus, was guilty of aiding and abetting violations of the securities laws. 274 In affirm-
ing the lower court's entry of an injunction against the attorney, the Second Circuit held
that the scienter requirement for civil liability under Rule I Ob-5 announced in Hochfelder
was not applicable in an SEC civil injunctive action. 275 In this type of prophylactic
proceeding for injunctive relief, the court of appeals stated, a cause of action could be
based solely upon a showing of negligence."
Finally, in its 1978 decision in SEC v. Coven, 277 the Second Circuit extended the
holdings of Spectrum and Universal Major Industries to hold that a permanent injunction
could be issued against an opining attorney for aiding and abetting violations of Section
17(a) of the Securities Act without a showing of scienter. 278 In Coven, an attorney who
had responsibility for effectuating a public offering of a corporation's securities drafted
an "all or nothing" escrow agreement which provided that all funds obtained from
buyers be kept in an escrow account until the first three million shares of the stock had
267
 Id. at 542.
268 Id. at 541.
269 Id,
270 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).
271 For a discussion of Hochfeleler, see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
272 Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d at 1047.
275 Id. at 1045-46.
274 SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., Civil Action No. 73-3626, at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,
1973).
275 Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d at 1047.
276 Id. Furthermore, even if scienter was required, the court declared that there was evidence
to support the district court's finding that the opining attorney had acted with "knowledge or
reckless disregard to the truth." Id.
277
	 F,2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978).
275 Id. at 1026-28. For a discussion of the elements of an action brought for alleged violations
of section 17(a), see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
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been sold. 279
 During the closing of this "all or nothing" portion of the offering, the bank
refused to release the funds in the escrow account until it had assurance that three
million shares had been sold. 28° Although a meeting of the underwriters on the previous
day had made the attorney aware that no one was sure how many shares had been
sold,28 l the lawyer, Coven, issued an opinion letter representing that 3,075,000 shares
of the securities had been sold. 282
 As a result, the all or nothing portion of the account
was improperly closed and the proceeds from the sale of the stock were released. 288
When it later became apparent that the underwriters were attempting to manipulate the
price of the stock, the SEC brought injunctive actions against eleven persons, including
the attorney. 2"
In affirming the lower court's entry of a permanent injunction against Coven, the
Second Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder did not preclude
the district court from issuing an injunction based •on an aiding and abetting violation
of section 17(a) of the Securities Act without a showing of scienter. 288
 The court stated
that unlike section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, congressional intent was to allow an
injunction to be issued for a violation of section 17(a) on the basis of negligent conduct. 286
Therefore, the Second Circuit stated, "the test is whether an alleged aider and abettor
should have been able to conclude that his act was likely to be used in furtherance of
illegal activity in light of all the circumstances." 287
As this discussion has demonstated, in a series of decisions handed down during
the 1970's, the Second Circuit greatly expanded opining lawyers' potential liability in
SEC injunctive actions. After these decisions, the SEC no longer had to establish that an
attorney issued an incorrect opinion with intent to defraud or even with reckless disre-
gard for the truth. 288
 Simple negligence by a securities lawyer in rendering an opinion
now sufficed to subject the attorney to an SEC injunctive action. 289
2. Retreat by the Courts From the Negligence Standard
While the decisions of the Second Circuit during the 1970's indicated that an
injunctive action could be brought against an attorney solely for negligence in rendering
opinions, 289
 during the 1980's the courts seemingly have retreated from this negligence
279 581 F.2d at 1022.






", Id. at 1025-28.
2'6 Id. at 1026-27.
287
 Id. at 1028. Moreover, because Coven had rendered the opinion of counsel to the bank even
though he had been put on notice that no one was sure exactly how many shares had been sold,
the court held that his actions were not only negligent for purposes of satisfying the intent require-
ment of Section 17(a), but also amounted to the kind of reckless disregard for the truth sufficient
to support a finding of scienter under Section 10(b). Id. at 1028.
288 See supra notes 264-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
2" Sec supra notes 264-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases adopting a negli-
gence standard for determining the liability of opining lawyers.
29° See supra notes 264-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of these Second Circuit
opinions.
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standard."' In the 1980 case of SEC v. Aaron, for example, the Supreme Court held
that in injunctive actions brought for alleged violations of section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act or section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, the SEC must show that the defendant acted
with scienter to obtain injunctive relief. 292 While the Aaron Court did hold that negligence
by a defendant could suffice for an injunction to be entered against him under section
17(a)(2) or (a)(3) of the Securities Act, 293
 the Court expressly recognized that the presence
or absence of scienter would likely be an "important factor" in deciding whether an
injunction should be issued in a particular case."' Moreover, subsequent decisions by
federal courts indicate that these courts have retreated from the negligence standard. 295
Therefore, to obtain injunctive relief against an opining attorney today, it appears that
the SEC must show that a defendant acted with an intent to defraud or with reckless
disregard for the truth. 296
For example, the Tenth Circuit in the 1981 case of SEC v. HaswelP97 upheld a district
court's ruling that the SEC must show that an attorney acted with an intent to defraud,
or at least with reckless disregard for the truth, in issuing an erroneous legal opinion to
obtain injunctive relief. 299 In Haswell, the Commission brought an injunctive action
against an opining attorney alleging that he had aided and abetted violations of section
I7(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) and Rule I Ob-5 of the Exchange Act by
issuing a favorable bond opinion after he had been put on notice that the sellers of the
bonds were likely to commit fraud. 299
In considering these charges, an Oklahoma federal district court first asserted that
to establish an aiding and abetting violation under sections 10(b) and 17(a), it was
necessary to show that an opining attorney's conduct amounted to "fraud or conduct so
reckless that it was an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care." 30° Based
on the evidence before it, the court found that Haswell had rendered carefully consid-
ered opinions, which, whether correct or incorrect, had been made "in utmost good
faith." 3O 1
 Therefore, the district court held that the attorney had not violated the secu-
rities laws and denied the SEC's application for an injunction against Haswell." 2 Sub-
29 ' See infra notes 292-308 and accompanying text.
292 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
2";'' Id, For a discussion of Aaron and the rationale For the Court's decision, see supra notes 67-
68 and accompanying text.
294 446 U.S. at 702; see also id, at 703 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("because the Commission must
show some likelihood of a future violation, defendants whose actions have been in good faith are
not likely to be enjoined").
29' See infra notes 297-308 and accompanying text.
29" See infra notes 297-308 and accompanying text.
297 645 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1981), aff'g, SEC v. Haswell, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1197,156 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 19, 1977).
298 Haswell, 654 F.2d at 699-700.
299
 SEC v. Haswell, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 1197,156, at 93,774
(W.D. Okla. Oct. 19, 1977),
300
 Id. at 96,375. The district court further stated that to be subject to liability under these
sections, the attorney must have engaged in "conduct which presented a danger of misleading
buyers that was either known to Haswell or was so obvious that he must have been aware of it." Id.
3°I Id. at 96,376.
30, Id. Moreover, the district judge stated that even if Haswell had violated the securities laws,
no injunction should be entered against him. Id. at 96,376. According to the court, in light of his
reputation as a "scholarly, ethical, and cautious attorney," there was not a reasonable likelihood that
the wrong would be repeated. Id.
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sequent to this decision, however, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Aaron
V. SEC."
In hearing the appeal of the Haswell case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision
of the court below regarding the alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1), finding
that the evidence supported the district court's holding that the opining attorney had
not acted with the requisite scienter. 3G4 The court of appeals further stated that although
scienter was not a necessary element of section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) violations, the Supreme
Court had indicated in Aaron that the presence or absence of scienter still bears heavily
on a court's decision on whether or not to grant an injunction under these sections. 3° 3
The Tenth Circuit stated that, according to the Aaron holding, the degree of scienter in
an attorney's conduct was an important consideration in determining the likelihood of
future securities laws violations by the defendant which the SEC had to establish to
obtain an injunction.306 Thus according to the court of appeals the district court's finding
that Haswell had acted in good faith in issuing the legal opinions supported its decision
to deny the SEC's request for injunctive relief."' Given this lack of scienter by the
opining attorney in the, present case, the Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's deci-
51on. 3"
3. Opining Attorneys' Liability in SEC Injunctive Actions Today
This section has demonstrated that during the 1970's not only did the number of
SEC injunctive actions brought against opining attorneys increase, 309 but also the scope
of activities for which the Commission instituted these suits expanded. 31° SEC injunctive
actions were no longer limited to instances where the attorneys were principals in schemes
to defraud investors. 3 " Beginning in the 1970's, the SEC instituted injunctive actions
against attorneys who, acting solely in their professional capacity, issued legal opinions
which, in the view of the Commission, had aided and abetted the transgressions of their
clients. 3 t 2 Also, during this time period, the SEC contended that an opining attorney
had a duty to report a client's fraudulent activities to the Commission. 3 "
Today, in the area of SEC injunctive actions, the precise contours of a securities
attorney's obligation to disclose a client's fraudulent actions have not been fully re-
solved.3 " While the lawyer must take steps to avoid assisting a client in perpetuating a
3" 446 U.S. 680 (1980). For a discussion of Aaron and the rationale for the Court's decision see
supra notes 67-68 and 292-94 and accompanying text.
Haswell, 654 F.2d at 700.
" Id. at 699.
3" Id. at 699-700 (quoting Aaron, 446 U.S. at 701).
3°7 Id. at 700.
5°8 Id.
• 109 See supra note 199.
310 See supra notes 200 and 201.
53 See supra note 201.
312 See supra note 201.
313 This view of securities attorneys' duties was put forth in the SEC's filing of the National
Student Marketing complaint. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 93,360, at 91,913-15 —17 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972). For a discussion
of the SEC's filing of this complaint and the litigation which followed it, see supra notes 218-263
and accompanying text.
914 See supra notes 262-263 and accompanying text.
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fraud, the National Student Marketing view of an attorney as a "whistle blower" seems to
have been abandoned."
Similarly, while the Second Circuit during the 1970's held that in injunctive actions
the intent element of an aiding and abetting offense could be satisfied by a showing of
negligence by an opining lawyer," today courts appear unwilling to adopt this standard.
The Supreme Court in Aaron established that scienter must be shown in injunctive actions
brought against attorneys for alleged violations of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act. Moreover, as the Haswell decision demonstrates,
even in injunctive suits instituted for alleged violations of section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) of
the Securities Act, the presence or absence of scienter in an opining attorney's conduct
is likely to influence significantly a court's decision of whether to issue an injunction.""
Thus, if an attorney can demonstrate good faith in rendering legal opinions, even if his
advice is subsequently determined to be incorrect, courts are unlikely to enter an in-
junction against the lawyer. 318
 A further limitation on the susceptibility of opining attor-
neys to injunctive actions as the National Student Marketing action against Lord, Kissel &
Brook manifests, arises from the requirement that an attorney's issuance of a legal
opinion play a major role in the completion of his client's fraudulent activities for the
substantial assistance portion of the aiding and abetting action to be satisfied. 319 As the
Coven, Spectrum, and Century Investment Corp. decisions illustrate, courts have granted
injunctive relief only when an attorney's legal opinion deals with specific issues and is
relied upon by other parties in the consummation of an illegal transaction. 320
315 See discussion of In re Carter and Johnson infra notes 394-97 and accompanying text.
" 6 See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 590
(1979); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1980).
317 Haswell, 654 F.2d at 699-700; see also Leiman, supra note 11, at 287-88.
"e Haswell, 654 F.2d at 699-700; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980); id. at 703
(Burger, C. J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that "be-
cause the Commission must show some likelihood of a future violation, defendants whose actions
have been in good faith are not likely to be enjoined." Id. Also, in the recent case of In re Carter
and Johnson, the SEC itself asserted that:
1i1t is axiomatic that a lawyer will not be liable as an aides and abettor merely because
his advice, followed by his client, is ultimately determined to he wrong. What is missing
in that instance is wrongful intent on part of the lawyer. It is that element of intent
that provides the basis for distinguishing between those professionals who may be
appropriately considered as subjects for discipline and those who, acting in good faith,
have merely made errors of judgment or have been careless.
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 84,167 (Feb. 28, 1981). For a discussion
of In re Carter and Johnson see infra notes 349-88 and accompanying text.
919
 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 714 (D.D.C. 1978). The district
court in this case contrasted the merger opinion rendered by Lord, Bissell & Brook with the legal
opinions rendered by counsel in the Spectrum and Coven eases. The court stated, "this is not a case
where an opinion of counsel addresses a specific issue and is undeniably relied on in completing
the transaction." Id.
12° See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489
F.2d 535, 537-40 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 714
(D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1193,232, at 91,443 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1971); see also Note, Attorneys' Liability, supra note 4, at
445.
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B. Rule 2(e) Disciplinary Proceedings
While Rule 2(e) actions were historically instituted against attorneys in cases involving
egregious fraudulent activities, in the last fifteen years, the SEC's use of this disciplinary
proceeding has undergone significant changes. 321 Similar to the pattern which occurred
with respect to SEC injunctive actions, the Commission during the 1970's, dramatically
expanded the scope and use of its Rule 2(e) action. 322 In recent years, however, the
Commission has sought to restrict the usage of its disciplinary proceeding. 323 This sub-
section will begin with an examination of the expansion in Rule 2(e) actions which took
place during the 1970's. The second part of this subsection will discuss the In re Carter
and Johnson decision and recent statements by SEC chief counsels which demonstrate the
SEC's changing position towards employment of this disciplinary action.
1. Expansion in the Scope and Use of the Rule 2(e) Actions During the 1970's
During the early 1970's, in a development parallel to that of SEC injunctive actions,
the SEC sought to expand the use and scope of the Rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings.
One method by which this expansion was accomplished was the promulgation of amend-
ments to the Commission's disciplinary rules which contained additional and more
explicit grounds for suspending professionals such as attorneys from practicing before
the SEC. 324 During this period, the SEC also adopted the view that its invocation of Rule
2(e) proceedings would no longer be limited to cases where attorneys or other profes-
sionals filed false reports with the Commission or engaged in some other type of fla-
grantly unethical conduct which, in the Commission's view, threatened the integrity and
process of the agency. 325 Instead, the SEC took the position that it could suspend any
professional who failed to perform any duties or obligations owed to the Commission. 226
S21 Barber, supra note 83, at 521-22; Johnson, supra note 14, at 644-50; Klein, supra note 148,
at 612; Marsh, supra note 71, at 990-93; Comment, SEC Disciplinaty Rules and the Federal Securities
Laws: Regulation, Rules, and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DUKE L.J. 969, 984-85 [hereinafter
cited as Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules).
• "2 See infra notes 324-48 and accompanying text.
323 See infra notes 398-400 and accompanying text.
' 24 In 1970, Rule 2(e) was amended to add willful violations and willful aiding and abetting
violations of the federal securities laws or the rules or regulations thereunder as additional grounds
for suspending an attorney from appearing before the Commission. Securities Act Release No.
5088, [1970 Transfer Binder) FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCU!) 1177,913, at 80,333-34 (Sept. 24, 1970). In
addition, the rule was further amended at this time to provide for the automatic suspension of an
attorney if he has been suspended or disbarred by any state or convicted of a felony or misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude. Id. at 80,333. A 1971 amendment to Rule 2(e) further allowed the
Commission to suspend the privilege of appearing before the SEC of persons who have been
permanently enjoined from violating the federal securities laws or aiding and abetting the violation
of such laws. Id. An important feature of these amendments to Rule 2(e) is that the suspension of
the attorney's privilege of appearing before the Commission is automatic and takes effect imme-
diately. For discussion of the operation of Rule 2(e), see supra note 76. See also Johnson, supra note
14, at 648-49; Marsh, supra note 71, at 999-1000.
325 See In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1182,124, at 81,989-97 ( July 2, 1979) (opinions of Williams, Chairman concurring and Karmel,
Comm'r, dissenting). See also Barber, supra note 83, at 521-22; Marsh, supra note 71, at 991.
326 See authorities cited supra note 325.
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Consistent with this expansion in the scope of activities covered by Rule 2(e), the
number of 2(e) proceedings instituted by the SEC against lawyers in genera1, 327 and
opining attorneys in particular, increased dramatically."' Beginning in the 1970's the
Commission held that opining securities attorneys could not avoid administrative sanc-
tions under Rule 2(e) simply by not participating in fraudulent activities. 329 Stressing the
importance of attorneys' opinions in the securities area and the reliance of the investing
public on these opinions, the Commission applied its administrative sanctions against
opining attorneys who functioned solely in a professional capacity."°
The Commission's statements in In re Emmanuel Fields"' manifest the SEC's changing
philosophy about the circumstances in which Rule 2(e) actions should be instituted against
opining securities attorneys. 332 In Fields, the Commission instituted a 2(e) proceeding
against an attorney who had issued false and misleading opinions and had previously
consented to the entry of permanent injunctions against him.""" While Fields did not
dispute the SEC's factual allegations, he challenged the Commission's power to perma-
nently disqualify him from practicing securities laW. 334 In rejecting Fields' argument and
permanently disqualifying him from practicing before the Commission, the SEC stated:
Very little of a securities lawyer's work is adversary in character .
	 [Me
works in his office where he prepares prospectuses, proxy statements, opin-
ions of counsel, and other documents which we, our staff, and the financial
community, and the investing public must take on faith. This is a field where
unscrupulous lawyers can inflict irreparable harm on those who rely on the
327 While Rule 2(e) was promulgated in 1935, no disciplinary proceedings were instituted under
the Rule against attorneys until 1950. Klein, supra note 148, at 608. Between 1950 and 1959 inclusive,
four Rule 2(e) proceedings were brought against attorneys, N. at 609. Between 1960 and 1969
inclusive, ten Rule 2(e) actions were brought against attorneys. Id. at 609-12. Between 1970 and
1979 inclusive, forty-three Rule 2(e) actions 'were instituted against lawyers. Id. at 612. As one
commentator stated, "Igleonnetric growth fails adequately to describe the increased use of 2(e)
against lawyers" during the 1970's. Id.
518 No Rule 2(e) actions were brought against securities attorneys solely for issuing legal opinions
prior to 1970. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text. During the last fifteen years, several
2(e) actions have been instituted against lawyers for rendering erroneous legal opinions. See, e.g.,
In re Gibson, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 83,068, at 84,713 (Dec. 7,
1981); Attorneys' Opinion Letters, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,874, at 84,325
( June 3, 1981); In re Hodgin, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,334, at
82,426 (Sept. 27, 1979); In re O'Neil, Securities Act Release No. 5938 (Aug. 3, 1978) as reported
in Klein, supra note 148, at 627; In re Emmanuel Fields, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1179,407, at 83,175 n.25 ( June 18, 1973).
"9 See, e.g., Barber, supra note 83, at 521-22; Jenkins, supra note 11, at 516-18; Johnson, supra
note 14, at 643; Marsh, supra note 71, at 991; Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules, supra note 321, at
985. See also cases cited supra note 328. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see In re Keating,
Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 82,124, at 81,989-97
( July 2, 1979) (Williams, Chairman, concurring and Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting).
51) See cases cited supra note 328; see also Jenkins, supra note 11, at 517; Lowenfils, supra note
11, at 923-24.
" 1 [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,407 ( June 18, 1973).
5" See generally Gruenbaum, supra note 2, at 802; Krane, Attorney Unshackled: SEC Rule 2(e)
Violates Client's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 57 NOTRE DAME. LAW. 50, 55-56 (1981); Lowenfils,
supra note 11, at 423-24; Sonde, supra note 193, at 861-62.
"3 In re Emmanuel Fields, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1179,407, at 83,172,
83,175 n.25 ( June 18, 1973).
871 Id. at 83,173.
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disclosure documents that they produce. Hence, we are under a duty to hold
our bar to appropriately rigorous standards of professional honor. To expect
this vital function to be performed entirely by overburdened state courts
who have little or no contact with the matters with which we deal would be
to shirk that duty. 335
In accord with the philosophy expressed in Fields, the Commission during the 1970's
frequently used the Rule 2(e) action to discipline opining lawyers who, according to the
SEC, had failed to fulfill the responsibilities which these attorneys owed the investing
public. As it had in injunctive actions instituted during this time period, the SEG usually
alleged that the lawyer, solely by issuing an erroneous legal opinion, had aided and
abetted the securities law violations of a client. 336 In re Richard Hodgin 337 is typical of the
administrative proceedings brought by the SEC against opining attorneys during the
1970's. In that case, the SEC sought to revoke an attorney's privilege of appearing before
the Commission. 338 The attorney, Hodgin, who had been retained to represent certain
limited partnership interests, issued an opinion letter stating that the sale of these
interests was exempt from registration provisions of section 5 of the Securities Act. In
fact, the sale was not exempt from the registration requirements.'" In instituting Rule
2(e) proceedings against Hodgin, the SEC alleged that he had willfully violated and
willfully aided and abetted violations of the registration and antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws by his issuance of this opinion letter."' Hodgin consented to the
entry of an order under which he was suspended from appearing before the Commission
for twelve months. 3-01 One member of the SEC, Commissioner Karmel, dissented from
this judgment because, in her view, the attorney's conduct was not sufficiently egregious
to justify the temporary suspension. 342 According to Commissioner Karmel, this decision
exemplified the SEC's unwarranted expansion during the 1970's of the activities which
could be punishable under Rule 2(e). 343 She characterized the decision as "tantamount
to the setting of ethical and competency standards for the practice of law — something
this agency has neither the expertise nor the authority to do." 344 Since there had not
been "clear and convincing evidence of intentional misconduct" by Hodgin in rendering
"5 /d. at 83,174 n.20.
536 See cases cited supra note 328.
537 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,334 (Sept. 27, 1979).
5" Id. at 82,426.
359 Id.
3-4° Id.
94 ' Id. at 82,427.
342 Id. at 84,427 (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner Karmel stated that Rule 2(e)
actions should only be brought in instances where a lawyer has improperly conducted himself while
personally representing clients before the Commission and, thus, directly threatened the SEC's
administrative process. Id. She asserted that the Rule 2(e) action should be employed only in cases
in which the attorney's conduct affected the Commission's ability to function or obstructed admin-
istrative justice. Id. Commissioner Karmel was a vocal opponent on the expansion in the use and
scope of activities covered by Rule 2(c) which occurred during the 1970's. See In re Keating, Muething
& Klekamp, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 82,124, at 81,992-97 ( July 2, 1979)
(Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting); Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the
SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747 (1975).
545 Hodgin, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,334, at 82,427 (Karmel,
Comm'r, dissenting).
344 Id.
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the erroneous opinion, Commissioner Karmel asserted that Rule 2(e) proceedings should
not have been instituted against him, 343
As Hodgin indicates, during the 1970's, the SEC no longer limited its use of Rule
2(e) actions to instances of egregious fraud by opining lawyers. Instead, through the
employment of the newly adopted aiding and abetting hasis for Rule 2(e) proceedings,
the Commission disqualified attorneys from practicing securities law based solely on
actions taken in a professional capacity as a client's advisor. 346 Moreover, during this time
period, the Commission seemingly took the position that Hochfelder's scienter require-
ment was inapplicable in Rule 2(e) aiding and abetting actions. 347 While the SEC did not
explicitly state the standard of culpability required in these actions, it appeared that the
Commission had instituted Rule 2(e) actions based solely on negligent mistakes by law-
yers. 345 Thus, prior to 1980, simple negligence by an attorney in rendering an opinion
could have resulted in a lawyer forfeiting the privilege of practicing securities law.
2. A Higher Threshold In Rule 2(e) Proceedings: In re Caner and Johnson
In the 1981 case of In re Carter and johnson,549 the SEC rejected the usage of a
negligence standard in aiding and abetting actions brought under Rule 2(e). 35° In this
disciplinary proceeding, the SEC also finally retreated from the National Student Marketing
view of a securities attorney's ethical responsibilities. 35 ' The Rule 2(e) proceedings against
Carter and Johnson arose out of the attorneys' activities as general counsel for the
National Telephone Company (National) 352 National was engaged in the business of
installing and leasing telephone systems which interfaced with AT & T equipment.'"
While National presented an outward picture of continued growth and profits, it was
faced increasingly with liquidity problems. 354 In an attempt to rectify this problem, in
the spring of 1974, the company arranged for a fifteen million dollar loan from a
consortium of banks. 355 Before the loan could be finalized, however, National began
taking short term advances on the loan and, by September 1974, had used up almost
the entire line of credit. 356 In an attempt to placate the banks, National agreed to enter
34 ' Id. at 82,848 (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting).
"6 See cases cited supra note 328 and authorities cited supra note 329.
"' See, e.g., Marsh, supra note 71, at 997-98; Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 7 SEC.
REG. L.J. 54, 54-57 (1979). In the trial portion of In re Carter and Johnson, discussed infra note
372 and accompanying text, the administrative law judge (A14) found that Hochfelder's scienter
requirement was inapplicable in Rule 2(e) actions. In re Carter and Johnson, [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175, at 82,180 (Mar. 7, 1979) (trial). According to the ALJ, "willful
in this context means intentionally committing the act which constitutes the violation." Id. (quoting
SEC v. Tager, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (8th Cir. 1965)).
3" See, e.g., In re Jo M. Ferguson, Securities Act Release No. 5523 (Sept. 3, 1974) (attorney
sanctioned under Rule 2(e) because he knew or should have known of violations).
.to in re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,847 (Feb.
28, 1981) (appeal).
339 Id. at 84,167.
3" Id. at 84,172-73. For a discussion of the SEC's view of an attorney's responsibility to blow
the whistle on a client, see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
3" Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 84,150-51
(appeal).
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into a "lease maintenance program" (LMP) if the company continued to experience
financial difficulties. 337 Under the terms of the LMP, National would wind down its
business by restricting sales and only maintaining leases which it had already sold.'"
Under the terms of the company's agreement with the banks, if National sought to
borrow additional funds from the banks or if certain liquidity ratios were not satisfied,
National would be required to institute the LMP. 339
During this period of financial crisis, National's president, Sheldon Hart, refused to
disclose the financial problems which the company was facing and continued to issue
optimistic reports to National's shareholders and the financial community.'" Specifically,
the particulars of the loan agreement, the existence of the LMP, and the potential
consequences of both for National were not disclosed in a December 20th press notice
released by National, a December 23rd letter to the company's shareholders, or in
National's Form 8—K 36 ' for December 1974. 362 The press release and the Form 8—K were
prepared by Hart with the assistance of attorneys Carter and Johnson. 363
By March 1975, National's financial situation had deteriorated to such an extent
that the company was required under the terms of the loan agreement to implement
the LMP. 364 In response to this situation, Hart, without knowledge of counsel, falsely
certified to the banks that compliance with the LMP had been initiated.'" Later in March
and again in April, Carter and Johnson advised Hart that National should publicly
disclose its obligation to implement the LMP. 3" Hart, however, refused to follow the
attorneys' advice.'" In fact, the terms of the loan agreement, including National's obli-
gation to implement the LMP were not disclosed until May 27, 1975, three days after
Hart was forced to resign as National's president.'" On July 2, 1975 National initiated
Chapter XI bankruptcy proceedings.'"
As a consequence of the attorneys' actions in connection with their representation
of National, the SEC instituted Rule 2(e) proceedings against Carter and Johnson."°
Specifically, the Commission charged that the attorneys had engaged in unethical and
unprofessional conduct during National's financial crisis. The SEC also alleged that the
lawyers had aided and abetted violations of the securities laws by assisting Hart in the
preparation of the misleading press release and Form 8—K and by failing to disclose
material facts concerning National's financial condition between May 1974 and May
l975.371 After conducting a hearing, an administrative law judge found that the evidence
s37
	 at 84,158.
338 Id. at 84,156-58.
"9 Id. at 84,158-59.
36° Id. at 84,159-62.
361 A form 8—K is a financial report which companies with registered securities must file with
the SEC.
362 Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,158-61
(appeal).
369 1d. at 84,160.
564 Id. at 84,161.
36
566 Id. at 84,162.
362 Id.
56' Id. at 84,163-64..
669 1d. at 84,152.
57° Id. at 84,150-51.
971 Id.
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supported all of the SEC's charges and suspended Johnson from appearing before the
Commission for nine months and Carter for one year." 2
On appeal, the SEC initially focused on whether the attorneys had aided and abetted
violations of the federal securities laws." 3 The Commission first found that National's
failure to disclose the true nature of the LMP in the December 20th press release and
in the December 8—K form constituted primary violations of the securities laws, 374 The
Commission then determined that the actions of the attorneys in the preparation of
these documents satisfied the "substantial assistance" elerrient of an aiding and abetting
offense."' The SEC rejected, however, the notion that negligence by a securities lawyer
was sufficient to satisfy the "intent" element of aiding and abetting. 376 Instead, the SEC
held that, in order to be found guilty of aiding and abetting, securities attorneys must
be "aware or know that their role was part of an activity that was improper or illegal." 377
The Commission emphasized that this intent element differentiated between an attorney
who should be subject to professional discipline and one who had made merely a good
faith error in judgment. 978 Stressing the need for securities attorneys to be able to give
advice without fear of legal liability or the loss of the ability to practice before the SEC,
the Commission concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that "either
attorney had acted with sufficient knowledge and awareness or recklessness to satisfy the
test for willful aiding and abetting." 3" Therefore, the SEC overturned the ALJ's decision
regarding the attorneys' violation of the federal securities laws."9
In addressing the issue of whether Carter and Johnson had engaged in unethical
or improper professional conduct, the Commission first asserted that an attorney with
significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a company's fulfillment of disclosure
requirements under the federal securities laws must take all reasonable steps to prevent
a client from engaging in illegal conduct. 39 ' According to the SEC, advising a client to
make accurate disclosure is initially sufficient to satisfy the attorney's professional re-
sponsibilities, even if the advice is not followed. 382 If the lawyer determines, however,
that his advice is not being sought in good faith, the attorney is required to take further
prompt action to avoid being co-opted into the fraud.'" The specific steps to be taken,
the SEC stated, depend on the facts of the individual case.'" Generally, in this type of
situation, the SEC recommended that the lawyer directly approach the board of directors
or other officers in the company about the senior executive's failure to make disclosures
required by the federal securities statutes."' Emphasizing that resignation should only
372 In re Carter and Johnson, (1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) II 82,175, at
82,180 (Mar. 7, 1979) (trial).
373 Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 182,847, at 84,165
(appeal).
3,4 Id. at 84,166.
373 Id.	 •









383 Id. at 84,173.
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be considered by the lawyer as a last resort, the SEC stated Is]o long as a lawyer is acting
in good faith and exerting reasonable efforts to prevent violations of the law by his
client, his professional obligations have been met. In general, the best result is that which
promotes the continued, strong minded participation of the lawyer.""6
Employing this standard to the case before it, the SEC found that both lawyers'
conduct was ethically improper because neither of the attorneys had advised National's
board of directors or any other National officer about Hart's refusal to disclose infor-
mation concerning the company's perilous financial situation."' Yet, because the contours
of a securities lawyer's ethical responsibilities were not clear at the time of the lawyers'
actions, the Commission determined that its ruling would have only prospective effect.
Therefore, the SEC reversed the ALys ruling that the attorneys had violated the ethical
standards of Rule 2(e). 588
3. Opining Attorneys' Potential Liability in Rule 2(e) Actions Today
While In re Carter and Johnson dealt with the issue of securities attorneys' susceptibility
to discipline under Rule 2(e) for the preparation of disclosure documents rather than
legal opinions, the Commission's holding in this case represents a transformation in the
views of the SEC towards the potential liability and ethical responsibilities of all securities
attorneys. 989 In the Carter and Johnson opinion, the SEC continued to hold that attorneys
who act solely in a professional capacity as advisors to their clients could be liable for
aiding and abetting violations of the securities laws."° Recognizing, however, that attor-
neys who are preoccupied with their own potential liability may be unable to adequately
perform their duties, the Commission rejected the position it had taken during the
1970's that mere negligence by an attorney in rendering an opinion or in advising a
client was sufficient to establish the requisite intent in an aiding and abetting action."'
After the Commission's decision, it would appear that an opining lawyer who acts
independently and in good faith cannot be sanctioned under the SEC's disciplinary rules
for alleged willful aiding and abetting violations of the federal securities laws. 392 To
impose sanctions in a Rule 2(e) proceeding today, the Commission must prove that an
attorney acted with specific intent to defraud or at least with reckless disregard for the
truth in rendering an incorrect legal opinion. 393
986 Id. at 84,172-73.
587 1d. at 84,171-72.
sae
	 at 84,173.
339 In Carter and Johnson, the SEC stated that, "we do not distinguish between the professional
advice of a lawyer given orally or in writing and similar advice which is embodied in drafting
documents to be filed with the Commission. Liability in these circumstances should not turn on
such artificial distinctions, particularly in light of the almost limitless range of forms which legal
advice can take." Id. at 84,166. For law review articles discussing the significance of the decision,
see Barber, supra note 83, at 538; Friedman, supra note 29, at 297-98; Kronstein, supra note 29, at
293-96.
39° Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,847, at 84,165-67
(appeal).
39 ' See id. at 84,167.
332 See id.
"3 Id.; see also Kronstein, supra note 29, at 293-96; In re Gibson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,068, at 84,713 (Dec. 7, 1981) (attorney was suspended from practicing
before the SEC for nine months for aiding and abetting a scheme to distribute unregistered and
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Moreover, in the Carter and Johnson decision, the SEC appears to have rejected the
view, which it espoused in National Student Marketing and advocated during the 1970's,
that a securities lawyer has a responsibility under the securities laws to blow the whistle
on a client. 394 At least in situations like the one in Carter and Johnson, the SEC now asserts
that a securities attorney does not have a duty to inform the Commission about a client's
intention to commit a fraud. 595 In this type of situation, the Commission now suggests
that the lawyer inform the board of directors or other officials in a company about a
chief executive's intention to violate the securities laws. 396 If the company still refuses to
take appropriate action, then the attorney must resign to avoid being co-opted into the
fraud.397
Subsequent to its decision in In re Carter and Johnson, the SEC has also indicated that
it will decrease the frequency with which it brings Rule 2(e) actions against attorneys. 398
In a recent speech, the then General Counsel for the SEC, Edward Greene, asserted
that the Commission should institute disciplinary proceedings against lawyers only if
they engage in misconduct which is a violation of established state ethical or professional
misconduct rules and has a direct impact on the Commission's processes. 999 Where
attorneys have willfully aided and abetted violations of the federal securities laws, Greene
asserted that the Commission should institute injunctive actions against the lawyers, not
Rule 2(e) proceedings.''' Thus, at least for the time being, the SEC has retreated from
its expansive use of Rule 2(e) actions and will institute these proceedings only in cases
of egregious conduct.
C. Civil Actions Brought By Private Plaintiffs Against Opining Attorneys Under The Federal
Securities Laws
The expansive view of the duties of opining securities attorneys which was dem-
onstrated in SEC injunctive actions and disciplinary proceedings during the 1970's has
also been in evidence to a certain extent over the last fifteen years in the area of civil
liability. 40 ' Traditionally, courts held that attorneys owed duties only to their clients and
unrestricted securities by recklessly opining that pledges of securities were exempt from registration
without setting forth Rule 144 resale restrictions).
394 Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FF.D. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) II 82,847, at 84,172-73
(appeal); see also Greene, supra note 27, at 84,800. For a discussion of this National Student Marketing
view of securities lawyers' duties, see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
1" Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 82,847, at 84,172-73
(appeal).
396 Id. at 84,172.
397 1d.
""' See Brown & Mahoney, Corporate Counsel, 15 INsT, ON SEC. REG. 95, 99 (1984) (comments of
present SEC General Counsel Dan Goelzer); see also Greene, supra note 27, at 84,799-800.
399 Greene, supra note 27, at 84,799-800.
400 Id. at 84,800. Present SEC General Counsel Dan Goelzer has indicated that his position is
the same as Ed Greene's. See Brown & Mahoney, supra note 398, at 99.
401 See, e.g., T.J, Raney & Sons v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330.
1333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783-85
(8th Cir. 1981); Cronin v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th Cir. 1980);
Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Utii. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1204-10 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Morgan
v. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 957, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re North Am. Acceptance
Corp. Securities Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608, 626-29 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Felts v. National Account Sys.
Ass'n, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 54, 67-68 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp.
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were subject to civil liability to the investing public only when actively participating in
fraudulent schemes. 402 Since approximately 1970, however, courts have held that attor-
neys who render legal opinions or prepare disclosure documents owe duties to the
investing public and may be held civilly liable to members of the investing public for
actions undertaken solely in a professional capacity as advisors to their clients. 403 Unlike
the pattern evidenced in SEC injunctive actions and Rule 2(e) proceedings, however,
courts have never held these attorneys liable to third parties under the securities laws
for mere negligence in rendering opinions. Instead, courts have found opining lawyers
civilly liable to private plaintiffs only when these lawyers knowingly or recklessly render
incorrect opinions which substantially assist the securities law violations of a client. 4(u
The first portion of this subsection examines the emergence of securities attorneys'
duty to protect the interests of the investing public and the imposition of liability on
these lawyers when they knowingly or recklessly fail to perform this duty. Secondly, the
most likely source of opining attorneys' liability to private plaintiffs, an action alleging
primary or aiding and abetting violations of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 4 °5 will
be discussed. The final portion of this subsection focuses on the recent trend of private
plaintiffs bringing suits against opining attorneys under the developing "fraud on the
market" theory.
1. Emergence of Securities Attorneys' Duties and Potential Liability to Investors under
the Federal Securities Laws
The trend towards holding securities attorneys to a higher standard of conduct
relative to the investing public first surfaced in the 1968 case of Escott v. Barchris Con-
struction Co. 406 In Barchris, an attorney-director, Grant, was held civilly liable under section
11 of the Securities Act to debenture holders of a bankrupt corporation because of false
and misleading statements contained in the company's prospectus. 407 While Grant's
liability was based on his position as a director, the court emphasized that, because he
was also an attorney, Grant was not entitled to rely upon his client's representations and
had a duty to verify his client's statements through a careful examination of the com-
643, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also Jenkins, supra note 11, at 511; Leiman, supra note 11, at 278-80;
Sommer, supra note 2, at 83,687-91.
"2 See supra notes 158-67 and accompanying text.
40, See cases cited supra note 401. While in the civil liability area during the 1970's the courts
began to move away from the traditional limits on opining attorneys' liability and began to impose
liability on lawyers who acted solely in a professional capacity as a client's advisor, no court attempted
to impose liability on attorneys under section 10 for simple negligence in issuing opinions.
404 See, e.g., T.J. Raney & Sons v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330,
i333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783-85
(8th Cir. 1981); Cronin v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th Cir. 1980);
Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1204-10 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Morgan
v. Prudential Group, inc., 527 F. Supp. 957, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re North Am. Acceptance
Corp. Securities Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608, 626-29 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Felts v. National Account Sys,
Ass'n, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 54, 67-68 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Escoti v. Barchris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp.
643, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also Jenkins, supra note 11, at 511; Leiman, supra note 11, at 278-80;
Sommer, supra note 2, at 83,687-91.
405 See Leiman, supra note 11, at 284 & n.18.
4°6
	
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
407 Id. at 690-92.
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pany's records. 108 Commentators and at least one court have noted that implicit in the
language of the Barchris decision is the view that securities lawyers rendering legal
opinions or preparing disclosure documents may not assume the truthfulness of their
clients' assertions and, thus, have a duty to investigate the validity of their clients'
statements. 109
Similarly, in Felts v. National Account Systems Association,41 ° citing the Barchris case as
well as the Frank and National Student Marketing decisions,1 " a federal district court held
an attorney liable to purchasers of a company's promissory notes because of the lawyer's
activities in connection with his representation of the issuer. 112 As was the case in Barchris,
the attorney, Peters, was also an officer in the issuing company. 1 " In his capacity as
counsel for the issuer, Peters erroneously advised the company's officials that its prom-
issory notes either were not securities or were within the intrastate exemption from
registration provided by the federal securities laws. 1 " Similar representations were made
to Mississippi state securities officials. 1 " When the company defaulted on payments to
the holders of its promissory notes, these investors brought an action against several
persons, including Peters, to recover for alleged violations of federal and state securities
laws.416
In considering whether Peters had aided and abetted violations of the federal
securities laws through his activities for the issuer, the court emphasized that Peters'
legal services "were undertaken not only for the benefit of the issuer but also, under the
securities laws, for the benefit of the purchasers of securities." 1 " After finding that
several primary violations of the federal securities laws had occurred and that Peters'
erroneous legal advice regarding exemption from registration had substantially assisted
these violations, 10 the court examined whether the intent element of the aiding and
abetting offense had been satisfied. 1 " According to the court, the failure of Peters as
counsel for the issuer to make a reasonable inquiry to ascertain the truthfulness of
statements made by his client and to conduct an independent investigation of whether
the notes were actually exempt from registration, constituted gross negligence and
recklessness. 1" Thus, finding that the scienter requirement of Hochfelder had been sat-
4" Id. at 690.
409 See Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54,67 (W.D. Miss. 1978); see Frank,
supra note 12, at 346-47; Johnson, supra note 14, at 650-51; Lowenfils, supra note 11, at 428-29;
Sommer, supra note 2, at 690-91.
410
 469 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
," Id. at 65-66.
412 Id. at 66-68. Peters was found to have violated the provisions of sections 12 and 17 of the
Securities Act and section 10(b) and Rule 106-5 of the Exchange Act. Id. at 67-68. In considering
the section 12 claim, the court stated that without the substantial assistance of Peters as attorney
for the issuer, the sale of the securities would not have been accomplished and, therefore, he was
liable under section 12. Id. at 68.
414 Id. at 60. Peters was the "titular president" of the issuer while another defendant, Steen,
actually controlled the activities of the enterprise.
419 Id.
415 Id. at 60-61.
416 Id. at 58,63.
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isfied, the court held Peters liable to the purchasers of the promissory notes for aiding
and abetting violations of the federal securities laws. 42 '
Thus, beginning in the late 1960's and continuing in the 1970's, as the courts and
the SEC began to broaden the role and responsibilities of attorneys under the securities
laws, the scope of the potential civil liability of lawyers under these laws also expanded.
As the cases discussed in this subsection demonstrate, attorneys who provide securities
advice to clients today are now viewed as having a duty to protect the interests of the
investing public. If a lawyer ignores this duty and intentionally or recklessly provides
incorrect advice to a client, injured investors are able to recover damages from the
attorney under the securities laws. Most frequently, injured investors allege that an
opining attorney aided and abetted the securities law violation of a client by the issuance
of an incorrect legal opinion. 422 Also, the recent development of the Shores approach to
the fraud on the market theory 42 ' has provided private plaintiffs with an additional
cause of action under which they may recover damages from opining attorneys. 424 The
next two subsections examine these private damage actions most frequently brought by
private plaintiffs against opining lawyers under the federal securities statutes today.
2. Opining Attorneys' Liability to Private Plaintiffs under Conventional Theories of
Rule 10b-5 Liability
The action which is most frequently instituted against opining attorneys by injured
investors under the federal securities laws is one alleging aiding and abetting violations
of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Two 1981 decisions, Stokes v. Lokken425 and In re
North American Acceptance Corp. Securities Cases,426 illustrate the standards under which
opining securities attorneys may be subject to civil liability to injured investors under
this conventional theory of section 10(b) liability. In both of these cases, the courts
considered motions for summary judgment made by opining attorneys who had allegedly
violated the securities laws by their issuance of opinions of counse1. 427
The Stokes case concerned the activities of an attorney, Lokken, who rendered an
opinion that the sale of coins in bulk did not involve the sale of securities. 428 While
4" Id. Peters and his co-defendant were required to pay the plaintiffs $163,409.47. Id. at 70.
- 42 2 See, e.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783-85 (8th Cir. 1981); Cronin v. Midwestern
Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th Cir. 1980); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util.
Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1204-10W.D. Mo. 1983); Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F.
Supp. 957, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re North Am. Acceptance Corp. Securities Cases, 513 F.
Supp. 608, 626-29 (N.D. Ga. 1981); see also Leiman, supra note 11, at 284 & n.18.
425 See supra notes 111-119 and accompanying text.
421 T.f . Raney, 717 F.2d at 1331-33; Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp.
1180, 1201-03, 1205-06 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
425 644 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981).
42fi 513 F . Supp. 608 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
07 In Stokes, the attorney was charged with aiding and abetting violations of section 10 and
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act and of violating the provisions of section 12 of the Securities Act.
644 F.2d at 781, 785. The Stokes case was on appeal from the district court's granting of the lawyer's
motion for summary judgement. Id. at 781. In North American Securities, the attorneys had allegedly
violated the provisions of sections 12(2) and 17 of the Securities Act and section 10(b) and Rule
1013-5 of the Exchange Act. 513 F. Supp. at 614-15.
425 Stokes, 644 F.2d at 782. The Stokes case developed out of the activities of the Continental
Finance Corporation (CFC) which was engaged in marketing precious metals. Id. While auditing
CFC's books, the accounting firm of Touche, Ross, & Co, requested a legal opinion concerning
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reaching this conclusion, Lokken noted in the opinion letter that these transactions could
conceivably he characterized as sales of securities and hence would be in violation of
federal and state securities laws.4 29 The conclusion that the sale did not constitute a sale
of securities later proved to be incorrect and the company for which the opinion letter
was issued went bankrupt. 43" After the institution of bankruptcy proceedings by the
issuer, purchasers of the company's securities instituted an action against several defen-
dants, including the opining attorney and his law firm, seeking compensation for dam-
ages suffered because of alleged violations of the federal securities laws.4 3 '
In considering an appeal of a district court's dismissal of the charges against the
attorney and his firm, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected
the plaintiff's contention that the attorney's reliance on facts provided by the issuer's
president constituted gross negligence and amounted to recklessness. 452 Stating that to
require a standard of independent factual inquiry in these circumstances would prevent
clients from obtaining expeditious legal advice and lawyers from maintaining a busy
practice,433 the Eighth Circuit held that the opinion letter was the product of a good
faith reliance on the facts given to the attorney by his client.4" Furthermore, the court
of appeals emphasized that the opinion noted that other attorneys could reach different
conclusions and that liability might result from reliance on the conclusions reached in
the opinion.435 Therefore, the court found that Lokken had not acted recklessly or with
an intent to defraud and, thus, held that the scienter element of aiding and abetting
had not been satisfied. 43"
In connection with the substantial assistance element of aiding and abetting, the
court further noted that Lokken's legal opinion had been given not to the issuer, but to
independent auditors who had then given issuer a clean audit report. 437 While the
accounting firm may have relied on Lokken's opinion letter, the court held that, given
the facts of this case, such reliance is hardly proof of substantial assistance considering
the hedging nature of the opinion."43 ' Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's entry
of summary judgment in favor of the attorncy. 43'
In the North American Securities case, the investors charged the law firm of Arnall,
Golden & Gregory (Arnall) with violations of the registration and antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws in connection with its representation of the North American
Acceptance Corporation (NAAC). .140 NAAC was principally engaged in making first and
whether the sale of gold and silver on margin accounts constituted a sale of securities within the
meaning of federal and state securities laws. Id.
429 Id.
48° /d. at 781,784.
431 ./d. at 781.
432 Id. at 783 n.3.
433 Id.





4" Id. The court dismissed the section 12 claim because Lokken had not been in privity of
contract with the purchasers and his opinion letter had not been a substantial factor in causing the
sales to take place. Id. at 785.




second mortgages on residential properties and in servicing the receivables this business
generated."' To help finance its operation, NAAC sold three separate intrastate debt
securities which were not registered with either the SEC or state officials. 442 NAAC also
owned a forty—six percent interest in Securities Mortgage Investors (SMI), which was
NAAC's principal customer for the sale of its receivables." 3 In March, 1972, NAAC was
purchased by Omega-Alpha. Inc., which proceeded to transfer most of the cash and
assets out of NAAC. 444 Furthermore, during this period, NAAC lost its favorable position
with SMI because of that company's merger with another firm. 495 By May, 1973, NAAC's
principal source of income to repay holders of its debt notes was the sale of additional
debt securities through television, newspapers, and direct solicitation: 4-m In February,
1974, NAAC filed Chapter X1 bankruptcy proceedings. 447
After NAAC's financial collapse, purchasers of the company's debt securities filed a
class action against several defendants, including Arnall, alleging violations of the reg-
istration and antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws." Some of these alle-
gations were based on legal opinions rendered by the firm which stated that NAAC's
thrift and term notes were exempt from the registration provisions of the Securities Act
because of the exemption provided to intrastate securities by section 3(a)(11) of the
Securities Act. 449
In deciding whether sufficient evidence existed to establish the three elements for
an aiding and abetting violation, the North American Securities court focused on whether
the requisite culpability on the part of the law firm existed to satisfy Hochfeliter's scienter
requirement. 4" Noting that Arnall knew that, as a result of its advice, purchasers of the
debt securities would receive no prospectus disclosing the risks relating to the purchase,
the court stated that "extreme recklessness" would satisfy the scienter standard. 451 The
court further asserted that in finding NAAC's thrift and term notes were within section
3(a)(I 1) of the Securities Act "intrastate exemption" from registration, the lawyers for
Antall had to determine that the section's "doing business" requirement was satisfied. 452
441 Id. at. 615.
442 id. NAAC sold: (I) thrift notes, which were simply promissory notes bearing specified
maturity dates nine months from the date of purchase but redeemable upon demand of the holder;
(2) term notes, which were promissory notes payable one to five years after the date of sale; and
(3) thrift certificates, which were identical to thrift notes but were not payable upon demand. Id.
415 Id.




. 415 Id. at 614-15.
"9 Id. at 617.
4" Id. at 625-26.
451 Id. at 626. In support of its position that recklessness satisfied Hochfelder's scienter require-
ment in an aiding and abetting action, the court cited Oleck v. Fisher, [1979 Transfer Binder) FED.
SEC. L. REP, (CCH) 1196,898 (S.O.N.Y. 1978), and Sharp v. Coopers Sc Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879
(E.D. Pa. 1978).
152 503 F. Supp. at 626. Section 3(a)(1 I) of the Securities Act provides an exemption from
registration to intrastate issues. To qualify for this exemption, the issuer must meet the "doing
business in the state" requirement. This requirement is satisfied only by performance of substantial
operational activities in the state by the issuer and is not met simply by performance in the state of
such activities as bookkeeping or maintaining stock records. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434
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The court found that Arnall had decided on using an "operating income" test 455 to
satisfy the doing business requirement, although its attorneys possessed information
which militated against the availability of the exemption. 454
 The court additionally found
that the attorneys excluded the $27,000,000 NAAC loaned to Omega-Alpha, and SMI's
purchases of receivables held by NAAC, from their operating income calculations. 455 In
light of these facts, the court stated it was "unable to conclude as a matter of law that
Arnall's opinions were not recklessly or intentionally erroneously rendered" or that
Arnall did not construct its legal tests to accommodate unfavorable facts. 4" Thus, the
motion for summary judgment was denied. 457
As these cases demonstrate, by the 1980's, courts had abandoned traditional limits
on opining attorneys' civil liability under the securities laws and were now willing to hold
lawyers liable for damages under these statutes for actions taken solely in their capacity
as a client's advisor.458
 This expansion in potential liability of opining lawyers under the
federal securities laws occurred largely through the development of the concept of aiding
and abetting.459
 In aiding and abetting actions brought against opining attorneys, a
central issue is usually the intent or awareness with which an opinion allegedly containing
(1961), reprinted in L. Loss, supra note 124, at 319-25. For a general discussion of the current
"doing business" requirement see Securities Act Release No. 5450 (1974), reprinted in L. Loss, supra
note 124, at 329-30.
4" According to Rule 147, which is set forth in Securities Act Release No. 5450, an operating
income test is one method of determining whether an issuer is entitled to an intrastate exemption.
In order to satisfy this test, at least 80% of issuer's gross revenues must be derived from the
operation of business or property located in the state and, 80% of issuer's assets must be located in
the state. Securities Act Release No. 5450, reprinted in L. Loss, supra note 124, at 329-30.
154
 503 F. Supp. at 627. The facts which indicated that the "doing business" requirement was
not met included the following: (1) 74% of NAAC's assets were outside Georgia; (2) three out of
four directors of NAAC were from out-of-state; (3) 51.6% of its direct loans were out-of-state; (4)
76.5% of its home improvement loans were out-of-state; (5) all land loans were out-of-state; (6)
only 10.4% of all operating assets were in Georgia. Id.
4" Id.
456 Id. at 629.
4" Id. The section 12 charges brought against AGO were dismissed because there was no privity
between the law firm and the sellers and AGG could not be found to have caused the sale of the
securities "simply because it advised NAAC that the intrastate exemption was available and advised
NAAC to continue selling notes in a time of financial instability." Id. at 620. Subsequent to the
district court's denial of the motion for summary judgment, the defendants in the case, AGG, the
First National Holding Corporation and Sol Blaine settled the case out of court. The defendants
agreed to pay the plaintiffs $2,100,000 in consideration for dropping their suit. In re North Am.
Acceptance Securities Co. Cases, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 98,831, at
94,260 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 1982).
158
 See, e.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783-85 (8th Cir. 1981); Cronin v. Midwestern
Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th Cir. 1980); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util.
Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1204-10 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Morgan V. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F.
Supp. 957, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re North Am. Securities Co. Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608, 626-
29 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
See, e.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783-85 (8th Cir. 1981); Cronin v. Midwestern
Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th Cir. 1980); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util.
Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1204-10 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F.
Supp. 957, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re North Am. Securities Co. Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608, 626-
29 (N.D. Ga. 1981); see also Leiman,supra note 11, at 284 & n.18. For a discussion of the requirements
of an aiding and abetting action see supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
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misrepresentations and omissions was rendered- 46° To be held liable for damages to a
third party an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, that is scienter, by the lawyer
in rendering the opinion must be established — mere negligence will not suffice."'
Courts also generally have held that recklessness in issuing an erroneous opinion is
tantamount to scienter and is sufficient to establish the liability of an opining lawyer.462
As the Stokes case illustrates, however, if an attorney can show good faith in relying on
facts provided by the client or in interpreting the law, no liability will be imposed."' As
the North American Securities litigation demonstrates, only where an opining lawyer closes
his eyes to what is readily apparent or twists the facts or law to reach the conclusion his
client desires are courts willing to find that the scienter requirement has been satisfied
and to impose liability on the opining lawyer.'"
To satisfy the substantial assistance element of an aiding and abetting action, a
private plaintiff must establish that an attorney's issuance of a legal opinion played an
integral role in the completion of a client's fraudulent activity. 455 Thus, if, as in Stokes, a
lawyer renders a "reasoned opinion" which states that it is possible for others to reach a
different conclusion, the substantial assistance element of the offense probably will not
be satisfied.'" Only when an attorney gives a "clean opinion" which addresses a single
issue and is relied upon by others in completing a transaction will the substantial assis-
tance element of an aiding and abetting action be satisfied and the attorney be subject
to liability for damages under the securities laws."'
460 See In re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 9 82,847, at
84,166-67 (Feb. 28, 1981); see also Block, supra note 69, at 1787; Leiman, supra note 11, at 283-
85; Note, Attorneys' Liability, supra note 4, at 445; Note, Stokes v. Lokken: Attorney Liability Under Rule
10b-5, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1027, 1030 -36 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Attorney Liability
Under Rule lab-5].
461 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1976). For a discussion of Hochfelder,
see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
462 See, e.g., T.J. Raney & Sons v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2c1 1330,
1333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 784 (8th
Cir. 1981); Cronin v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 862 (10th Cir. 1980); Morgan
v. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 957, 960-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re North Am. Securities
Co. Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608, 626 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
469 Stokes, 644 F.2d at 783 n.3, 784.
4" In re North Am. Securities Co. Cases, 513 F. Supp. at 628-29.
465 See Stokes, 644 F.2d at 784; see also SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1978);
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 537-40 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 714 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 93,232, at 91,443 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1971); Note,
Attorneys' Liability, supra note 4, at 445; but see Garter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEG.
L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,166 (appeal) ("[t]he second element — substantial assistance — is
generally satisfied in the context of a securities lawyer performing professional duties, for he is
inevitably deeply involved in his client's disclosure activities and often participates in the drafting
documents").
466
.See Stokes, 664 F.2d at 784.
467 See id.; see also SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Spectrum, 489
F.2d 535, 537-40 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 714
(D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1193,232, at 91,443 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1971); Note, Attorneys' Liability, supra note 4, at 445;
but see Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 82,847, at 84,166
(appeal) ("[t]he second element — substantial assistance — is generally satisfied in the context of a
securities lawyer performing professional duties, for he is inevitably deeply involved in his client's
disclosure activities and often participates in the drafting documents").
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3. Development of Opining Securities Attorneys' Potential Liability Under the Fraud
on the Market Theory
In recent years, the development of the fraud on the market theory under Rule
1013-5 468
 has provided private plaintiffs with an additional cause of action under which
they may recover damages from opining lawyers under the federal securities laws. 469
Under the Shores approach to the fraud on the market theory, 47° individuals who partic-
ipate in schemes which result in an entirely unmarketable security being placed on the
market may be held liable under Rules 10b-5(1) and 10b-5(3) to purchasers of this
security. 471 In recent cases, courts have held that lawyers who render opinions of counsel
may be held liable for damages to the entire class of purchasers of an "unmarketable
security" under this new view of Rule 10b-5
In the 1983 case of Rose v. Arkansas Valley Environmental & Utility Authority, 4" for
example, a federal district court refused to dismiss the fraud on the market liability
charges instituted against an opining bond attorney by a class of purchasers of revenue
bonds.474 The Rose case involved the issuance in 1974 of revenue bonds by the Arkansas
Valley Environmental & Utility Authority (the Authority) to finance the construction of
streets, curbs, and gutters in a private real estate development in Prue, Oklahoma.'" In
connection with the issuance of these bonds, an attorney, Fred Rausch, issued favorable
legal opinions regarding the legality of the issuance of these bonds, 476
 After the Authority
defaulted on the payment of interest in June or July, 1975, purchasers of the bonds
brought an action against several persons, including Rausch, alleging that the bonds
were essentially worthless from the time they had been issued."'" The plaintiffs specifi-
cally alleged that, by omitting several material facts in his legal opinions, Rausch had
misled buyers of the securities and caused them to suffer losses as a result. 478
In considering Rausch's potential liability under the Shores approach to the fraud
on the market theory, the district court first held that, for the purpose of considering
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs had adequately established
that the Authority's bonds were so lacking in the basic essentials that, absent a fraudulent
4" For a discussion of the fraud on the market theory, see supra notes 111-19 and accompanying
text.
469 See, e.g., T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1331-33; Rose v. Arkansas Valley F,nvtl. & Util. Auth., 562
F. Supp..1180,1201-03,1205-06 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
4" For a discussion of the Shores approach to fraud on the market liability. see notes 111-19
and accompanying text.
4" Under this Shores approach to the fraud on the market theory, three elements must be
established: (1) the security involved must be so lacking in the basic elements that, in the absence
of a fraudulent scheme, it would never have been issued on the market at any price; (2) a defendant
must knowingly and actively participate in the fraudulent scheme which resulted in the security
being placed on the market; (3) the plaintiff must show that he relied on the "integrity of the
market" to furnish securities which were not the product of a fraudulent scheme. T.J. Raney, 717
F.2d at 1332-33; Shores, 647 F.2d at 469-70; Rake, 562 F. Supp. at 1201-03.
4'M
	 Raney, 717 F.2d at 1331-33; Rose, 562 F. Supp. at 1205-06.
175
	 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
474
 Id. at 1205-06.
475 at 1186.
4" Id. at 1205.
4" 1d. at 1187.
178 Id. at 1205-06.
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scheme, the securities would never have been issued. 479 The court further found that
the plaintiff's had relied on the integrity of the market in purchasing these securities."°
Finally, in considering Rausch's involvement in the fraudulent scheme, the court focused
on the attorney's issuance of favorable opinions of counsel regarding the legality of the
bonds."' Asserting that the rendering of a favorable bond opinion was a necessary step
in the issuance and marketing of the securities, the court concluded that Rausch's
issuance of an allegedly misleading opinion made him a "substantial actor and integral
participant" in the fraudulent schenie. 482 Therefore, the district court refused to dismiss
the fraud on the market charges brought against the opining lawyer, Rausch. 483
Similarly, in the 1983 case of T.J. Raney & Sons v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel
Authority,4 H4 the Tenth Circuit upheld a lower court's denial of a motion to decertify a
class action suit instituted against several defendants including an opining attorney under
the fraud on the market theory. 486 The Raney case concerned the activities of the Fort
Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Authority (Fuel Authority) which sought to provide natural
gas service to several counties in Oklahoma. 486 In connection with these activities, the
Fuel Authority attempted to structure itself as a valid public trust with the beneficiary
of the trust being the town of Eakly, Oklahoma. 487 After the formation of this purported
public trust, the Fuel Authority was allowed, under Oklahoma law, to issue tax-exempt
industrial bonds.488 After securing the legal opinion of its bond counsel that it was a
valid public trust which could legally sell bonds under Oklahoma law, the Fuel Authority
issued bonds, the proceeds of which were to be used for the construction or acquisition
of a gas distribution facility. 489 When the Fuel Authority failed to make the required
interest payments to its bondholders, T.J. Raney & Sons, a broker-dealer of securities,
brought a class action on behalf of the purchasers of the bonds against several defen-
dants, including the opining attorney, alleging various violations of' the federal securities
laws.490 The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the opining attorney had recklessly passed
on the validity and legality of the bonds and thereafter concealed the wrongful diver-
gence of the proceeds of the bonds."'
The trial court, upon consideration of these charges, first found that the Fuel
Authority was not a valid public trust and, therefore, was prohibited under Oklahoma
law from issuing tax-exempt industrial bonds. 492 At a later hearing, the court further
decided to deny the defendants' motion to decertify plaintiffs' class action which relied
47" Id. at 1201-03.
488 Id. at. 1206.
481 Id.
482 Id.
"s Id. The court also refused to dismiss the "traditional Rule 1013-5 claims" brought by the
plaintiffs against the opining attorney. Id. at 1207-10.
484 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983), (err. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984).
48, Id. at 1333; see also In re Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 468 F. Supp. 338,341
(W.D. Okla. 1979).
489 In re Fort Cobb, 468 F. Supp. at 340-41.
4" Id. at 340-43.
488 T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333.
4" Id. at 1331-32.
4 ' 0 Id. at 1332.
491 Id. at 1331-32.
492 In re Fort Cobb, 468 F. Supp. at 343.
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on the fraud on the market theory. 493 In affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth
Circuit first adopted the Shores approach to the fraud on the market theory. 494 In
determining the applicability of this theory to the case before it, the court of appeals
emphasized that the Fuel Authority was not a public trust and, consequently, was pro-
hibited under Oklahoma law from issuing any bonds. 495 Given the clear illegality of the
issuance of these securities, the Tenth Circuit held that, at least for purpose of consid-
ering the motion before it, the plaintiffs had established that the opining attorney had
"knowingly brought ... bonds to market with an intent to defraud." 496 After further
finding that the plaintiffs had relied on the availability of the securities as indicating
their lawful issuance and that they had suffered damages as a result, the court of appeals
upheld the decision of the district court and dismissed the defendants' rnotion. 497
As the Rose and T.J. Raney cases demonstrate, in addition to the traditional theories
of 10(b) liability, today attorneys may also be held liable to private parties under the
newly developed fraud on the market theory. Under the Shores approach to this view of
Rule 10b-5 liability, opining lawyers may be held liable to investors because of their
assistance to issuers or underwriters in placing a new security on the market 4 90 As recent
case law illustrates, if an attorney knowingly or recklessly issues an incorrect opinion
which allows an "unmarketable security" to be placed on the market, that lawyer could
be held civilly liable to the entire class of purchasers of the security regardless of whether
these individuals read or relied on the attorney's opinions.'"
The impact which the fraud on the market theory will have on the liability of
opining lawyers in the future, however, remains uncertain. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has demonstrated a marked reluctance to extend the limits of implied rights of
action under the federal securities laws. 500 The Court has instead prescribed a strict
statutory construction approach to determining liability under the federal securities
statutes. 50 ' The recent development. of the fraud on the market theory, which arises
from implying a private right of action from Rule 10b-5(1) and 10b-5(3), appears to
run counter to this trend. 512 This is especially true of the Shores approach to fraud on
the market liability which was described by the Eleventh Circuit as being "a context
495 7'. . Raney, 717 F.2d at 1331. •
494 Id. at 1332-33.




	 e.g., id.; Rose, 562 F. Supp. at 1204-06; see also Shores, 647 F.2d at 671.
Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333; Rose, 562 F. Supp. at 1204-06; see also Shores, 647 F.2d at 671.
5"" See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Touche, Ross & Co. v. Red-
dington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975);
but see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S, 375, 387-88 (1983) (''securities laws should
be construed not_ technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate their remedial purposes'")
(quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
50 ' See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); "Fouche, Ross & Co. v. Red-
dington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 962 (1977); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975);
but see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-88 (1983) ("'securities laws should
be construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate their remedial purposes'")
(quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).




where its [the fraud on the market theory's] application is most questionable." 503 Thus,
the validity of this new theory of opining attorneys' liability will likely be considered by
the Supreme Court in the near future.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE Or OPINING ATTORNEYS' LIABILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL
SEcuRITIEs LAWS AND ITS EFFECT ON OPINING ATTORNEYS AND THE SECURITIES BAR
During the last fifteen years, the liability of opining attorneys under the federal
securities laws has undergone significant changes. 504 Traditionally, opining lawyers were
held liable only when they actively participated in plans to defraud the public. During
the 1970's, however, through the dramatic increase in the use and scope of Rule 2(e)
and SEC injunctive actions, the Commission attempted to expand the ethical responsi-
bilities and potential liability of opining lawyers under the securities laws. 5 °5 In addition
to imposing liability and sanctions on these lawyers when they functioned solely in a
professional capacity giving advice to a client, the Commission advocated adoption of a
negligence standard in aiding and abetting cases and the imposition of a "whistle blowing"
ethical responsibility on securities lawyers. 506
Today, in SEC injunctive actions, Rule 2(e) proceedings and private damage actions
brought under the securities laws, courts have continued to impose liability or sanctions
on opining lawyers for actions taken solely in a professional capacity as a client's advi-
sor. 511' Today, in these actions, however, the SEC or a private party must establish: (1)
the existence of an independent securities law violation by a primary violator; (2) sub-
stantial assistance by the opining lawyer in the conduct that constitutes the violation; and
(3) awareness or knowledge by the opining attorney that his role was part of an activity
that was improper or illega1. 555 Thus, despite statements to the contrary by the SEC
during the 1970's, an opining attorney may not be subjected to liability under the federal
securities laws merely because he did not exercise reasonable care and negligently
reached an incorrect legal conclusion. 5°9 To be found guilty of an aiding and abetting
violation, the SEC or a private party must not only show that the lawyer's opinion was
erroneous, but also that the lawyer acted with an intent to defraud or at least with
reckless disregard for the truth in rendering the incorrect legal opinion. 510 Moreover, to
satisfy the substantial assistance portion of an aiding and abetting action, a plaintiff must
also establish that an attorney's issuance of a legal opinion played an integral role in the
completion of his client's fraudulent activity. 511
503 Lipton v. Documentation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 746 (11th Cir. 1984).
"4 See supra notes 309-20, 389-400, 422-24 and accompanying text.
6°5 See supra notes 199-204, 321-48 and accompanying text.
"6 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
5°7 See, e.g., SEC v. Haswell, 645 F.2d 698, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1981); Stokes v. Lokken, 644
F.2d 779, 783-84 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 82,847, at 84,167 (Feb. 28, 1981).
"' See, e.g., Stokes, 644 F.2d at 783-84; Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,167 (appeal).
619 See, e.g., Haswell, 654 F.2d at 699-700; Stokes, 644 F.2d at 783-84; Carter and Johnson, [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 84,167 (appeal).
510 See, e.g., Haswell, 654 F.2d at 699-700; Stokes, 644 F.2d at 783-84; Carter and Johnson, [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,167 (appeal).
5I1
	
assistance is one of the three requirements of aiding and abetting actions. See
supra note 58. For a discussion of the substantial assistance factor in cases concerning opining
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In a pattern similar to that evidenced in aiding and abetting actions, an opining
attorney is no longer perceived by the Commission as having an ethical obligation to
"blow the whistle" on a client. 5 ' 2 When faced with a client who intends to violate the
securities laws, the opining lawyer's obligation is to take appropriate steps to avoid being
co-opted into the fraudulent activity. 7 ' 3 As in other areas of the law, if all other actions
fail, the securities lawyer should resign as the client's counsel." 1
This evolution in the liability of opining attorneys during the last Fifteen years has
made the securities bar cognizant of the important contribution legal opinions make to
the proper functioning of the federal securities laws. These recent developments have
convinced securities attorneys to take steps to ensure that they fulfill their responsibilities
to the investing public. During this time period, commentators have written numerous
articles examining policies and procedures which should be followed in rendering legal
opinions. 5 ' 5
 In addition, the SEC, ABA, and the state bar associations have provided
practitioners with guidelines and forms to be used in drafting opinions of counsel. 516
Moreover, today, most law firms with significant securities practices have formulated
quality control procedures to ensure that legal opinions issued by members of their firms
meet the requirements of the securities laws. 517 This heightened awareness and care with.
which attorneys render legal opinions has undoubtedly made lawyers carefully circum-
scribe the opinions they render and has probably led to a reduction in the number of
erroneous opinions issued. 518 Thus, this expansion in the potential liability of opining
securities attorneys should be viewed as a beneficial development for the legal profession
and the investing public.
Moreover, the current standard of opining attorneys' liability, which allows these
attorneys to be subject to sanctions for actions taken solely in an advisory capacity, is
mandated by the underlying policy of the federal securities laws — protection of the
attorney liability, see Stokes, 644 F.2d at 785; SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F.
Stipp. 082, 714-15 (D.D.C. 1978); Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,847, at 84,166 (appeal).
5 ' 2 Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binderi FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 82,847, at 84,172-73
(appeal); see also Greene, supra note 27, at 84,800.
515 Carter and Johnson. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ig 82,847, at 84,172
(appeal).
5 " Id. at 84,173.
5j5 For a good bibliography of these articles, see Rowe, supra note 11, at 446-50.
516 See generally Report of the Committee on Corporations Regarding Legal Opinions in Business Trans-
actions, 14 PAC. L.J. 1001 (1983) (prepared by the Committee on Corporations of the Business Law
Section of the State Bar of California); Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, A Report of the
Special Committee on Legal Opinions and Commercial Transactions for the New York County Lawyers Asso-
ciation, 34 Bus. LAW. 1891 (1979): Report By Special Committee on Lawyers' Role in Securities Transactions:
The Association of the Bar of New York City, 33 Bus. LAW. 1343 (1978); Omnibus Opinion for Use by
Seller's Counsel in the Sale of a Closely Held Business, 61 MASS. L.Q. 108 (1976) (prepared by the
Subcommittee on Opinion Writing, Committee on Corporate Banking and Business Law, Mass. Bar
Association); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, ABA Formal Op. 346 (revised)
(1982); ABA Comm, on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, ABA Formal Op. 335 (1974).
517 Connell, Legal Opinions in the Context of a Private Placement, in OPINION LETTERS or COUNSEL
209 (1984); see also SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 96,027, at 91,600 (May 2, 1977); In re McLaughlin and Stern, Ballen, Sc Miller,
Securities Act Release No. 11553 (1975).
511' Conversation with Professor Scott Fitzgibbon, Professor of Securities Regulations at Boston
College Law School (March 21, 1986).
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interests of the investing public through disclosure of all material information." The
rendering of legal opinions by attorneys concerning compliance by their clients with the
federal securities laws plays an integral role in the fulfillment of this policy. 520 These
legal opinions are often the "passkeys" to securities transactions which determine whether
or not a particular sale of securities occurs. 52 ' Thus, by issuing correct legal opinions,
securities attorneys assure that the public's faith in the securities markets is maintained. 522
As Judge Friendly observed more than twenty years ago:
In our complex society ... the lawyer's opinion can be [an] instrument for
inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar . .
Congress could not have intended that men holding themselves out as mem-
bers of these ancient professions [the legal and accounting professions]
should be able to escape ... liability on a plea of ignorance when they have
shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen or have represented a knowl-
edge they knew they did not possess. 525
Opining lawyers, therefore, must be subject to sanctions or civil liability when they
knowingly or recklessly ignore this responsibility and issue erroneous legal opinions
which substantially assist the securities law violations of their clients. 524
While opining attorneys must be subject to liability for actions taken solely in an
advisory capacity to ensure protection of the investing public, the adoption of a negli-
gence standard as a measure of these lawyers' liability would likely have a "chilling effect"
on the performance of their duties for their clients. 525 Opining attorneys play an integral
role in the functioning of the investment markets. 526 The advice which opining lawyers
provide to their clients ensures that the investment community receives the flow of
material information which is necessary for the marketplace to operate effectively. 527 In
providing this advice, opining lawyers are often asked to make difficult judgments in
areas where legal precedent provides only general and inconclusive guidance. 529 If
securities attorneys were subject to sanctions or liability for simple negligence in giving
this advice, they would be inclined to issue broad, overly cautious opinions, instead of
5 '" Johnson, supra note 14, at 669; Sonde, supra note 193, at 842; Note, Attorney Liability Under
Rule 10b-5, supra note 460, at 1030.
,2* See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text; see also Frank, .supra note 12, at 338-41;
Oruenhaurn, supra note 2, at 798-800; Johnson, supra note 14, at 667-69; Sommer, supra note 2,
at 83,688-90.
52 ' See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
522 See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 480 F.2d 535, 540 (2d Cir. 1973); Attorneys' Opinion
Letters, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Re,'. (CCH) 4 82,874, at 84,326 ( June 1, 1981).
523 United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
521 See, e.g., Block, supra note 69, at 1787: Jenkins, supra note 11, at 553, 557; Johnson, supra
note 14, at 660; Messer, Role and Reasonable Expectations of the Underwriter, Lawyer and Independent
Securities Auditor in the Efficient Provision of Verified Information: Truth in Securities Reinforced, 52 NEB.
L. REV. 429, 454 (1973).
525 See, e.g., In re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) II 82,847,
at 84,167 (Feb. 28, 1981); see also Lipman, supra note 23, at 469-71; Note, Attorney Liability under
Rule 101,-5, supra note 460, at 1030. •
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the hard, specific advice required by their clients. 529 Moreover, lawyers who are viewed
by clients as being motivated by concerns for their own personal liability will no longer
be consulted on difficult issues."° This disincentive effect of the heightened standard of
liability upon the disclosure of material information to counsel, therefore, would provide
less protection to the public and could actually result in an increased number of securities
law violations."' It was in recognition of these potentially disastrous consequences that
both the SEC and the courts refused to impose liability or sanctions on opining lawyers
who, in good faith, were careless or made errors in judgment. 532
Moreover, so delimited, the imposition of liability on opining attorneys under the
securities statutes is consistent with the positions taken by courts concerning lawyers'
liability in other areas of the law. In the majority of states, for example, opining lawyers
may not be held liable to third parties for mere negligence in rendering opinions. 533
Like the federal courts and the SEC, these state courts feared that the adoption of a
negligence standard would adversely affect the quality of legal services provided by an
attorney. 554 Thus, in these jurisdictions, the privity requirement limits an opining lawyer's
liability to persons other than a client in those instances where a lawyer knowingly or
recklessly renders an incorrect legal opinion. 535 Even, in those states which have adopted
a negligence standard, courts, concerned with the effect which this heightened standard
of liability would have on a lawyer's actions, have taken measures to severely restrict the
scope of an attorney's liability under this standard."°
529 Id.; see also Lipman, supra note 23, at 469-71; Note, Attorney Liability Under Rule 106-5, supra
note 460, at 1030.
"' See Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,847, at 84,167




Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1182,847, at 84,167
(appeal); see also Lipman, supra note 23, at 471-72; Note, Duties and Obligations, supra note 90, at
142-43. •
552 See, e.g., SEC v. Haswell, 654 F.2d 698, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1981); Stokes v. Lokken, 644
F.2d 779, 783-84 (8th Cir. 1981); Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1182,847, at 84,167 (appeal).
"5 See, e.g., Amey, Inc. v. Henderson, Franklin, Staines, & Holt, 367 So.2d 633, 635 (Fla, App.
1979); Bloomer Amusement Co. v. Eskenazi, 75 Ill. App. 3d 117, 119, 394 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1979);
Grassi v. Tavito Homes, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 479, 480, 454 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (App. Div. 1982); First
Mun. Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, Potts, Aiken, Hargin, & Stewart, 648 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1983); Bell v. Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Goerke v. Vojvodich,
67 Wis. 2d 102, 105-06; 226 N.W.2d 211, 212-14 (1975); see also Note, Attorneys' Negligence and
Third Parties, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126, 126 (1982) (attorneys generally owe a duty of care only to
their clients).
"4 See, e.g., Bell v. Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). In Bell, the court
stated that "to hold defendant liable ... would inject self-protective reservations into the attorney's
counselling role. The attorney's preoccupation or concern with the possibility of claims based on
mere negligence ... would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client's interest."
Id.
5s5
	 e.g., Amey, Inc. v. Henderson, Franklin, Staines, & Holt, 367 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. App.
1979); Bloomer Amusement Co. v. Eskenazi, 75 Ill. App. 3d 117, 119, 394 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1979);
Grassi v. Tavito Homes, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 479, 480, 454 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (App. Div. 1982); First
Mun. Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, Potts, Aiken, Hargin, & Stewart, 648 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1983); Bell v. Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Goerke v. Vojvodich,
67 Wis. 2d 102, 105-06; 226 N.W.2d 211, 212-14 (1975); see also Newburger, Loeb & Co. v, Gross,
563 F.2d 1057, 1077, 1080 (2d Cir. 1977).
"6 See, e.g., Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. ad 335, 344, 556 P.2d 737, 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375,
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Similarly, lawyers acting solely in an advisory capacity who knowingly or recklessly
assist their clients in making false statements may be subjected to criminal liability under
other federal statutes.537 For example, in one case, an attorney was convicted of aiding
and abetting the making of a false statement by his client in a visa petition. 335 Finding
that the attorney had acted with reckless disregard of whether the statements made by
his client were true, 939 the Second Circuit stated that a lawyer cannot escape liability
"merely by closing his eyes to the obvious risk that he is engaging in unlawful conduct
.... [Hie cannot counsel others to make statements in the face of obvious indications of
which he is aware that those assertions are not true." 34° Thus, the standard of liability
of opining attorneys under the federal securities statutes is consistent with the approach
taken by the courts towards attorneys' liability in other areas of the law.
CONCLUSION
During the last fifteen years, the scope of potential liability of opining securities
attorneys has undergone significant changes. While traditionally the courts and the SEC
imposed sanctions and civil liability against opining attorneys only in instances where
they were active participants in schemes to defraud investors, these lawyers may now be
subjected to liability when acting merely in a professional capacity as advisors to their
clients. While during the 1970's the SEC and some courts asserted that opining lawyers
could be subjected to judicial or administrative sanctions for mere negligence in issuing
an opinion or for failing to disclose a client's fraudulent actions to the SEC, today an
opining attorney must knowingly or recklessly render an incorrect legal opinion which
substantially aids the federal securities law violations of his client in order to be subject
to sanctions or civil liability.
The major consequence of this evolution in opining attorneys' liability has been an
increased awareness on the part of opining securities lawyers of the importance of their
381 (1977) (without evidence that the attorney knew that his legal opinion would be transmitted to
and relied upon by this particular plaintiff, negligence standard should not be used); Dawdy v.
Sapp, 365 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (court created exception to privity rule in will
drafting case). In Goodman, the Supreme Court of California stated:
To make an attorney liable for negligent confidential advice not only to the client who
enters into a transaction in reliance upon the advice but also to the other parties to
the transaction with whom the client deals at arm's length would inject undesireable
self-protecting reservations into the attorney's counselling role. The attorney's preoc-
cupation or concern with the possibility of claims based on mere negligence (as distinct
from fraud or malice) by anyone with whom his client might deal "would prevent him
from devoting his entire energies to his client's interests." (Anderson v. Eaton, (1930)
211 Cal. 113, 116, 293 P. 788, 790.) The result would be both "an undue burden on
the profession" (Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824, 364 P.2d
685, 688) and a diminution in the quality of the legal services received by the client.
18 Cal. 3d at 345, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (citations omitted).
547 See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 508-10 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 953 (1964).
5" United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 880 (2d Cir. 1972).
535 Id. at 881.
54° Id.
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opinions and of their responsibilities to the investing public under the federal securities
laws. This growth in potential liability has, therefore, led to an increase in the care with
which these lawyers issue opinions and in the protection provided for the investing
public. Thus, the evolution in the scope of liability of opining securities attorneys during
the last fifteen years has been a beneficial development for all affected parties.
JOSEPH L. JOHNSON III
